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FOREWORD
Intervention in foreign states poses major challenges for policymakers and military strategists. Mounted
to alleviate a humanitarian crisis, end a civil conflict,
or replace a tyrannical regime, such operations put
conventional armed forces in situations for which
they are ill-equipped and inadequately trained. For
this reason, the U.S. Army has historically counseled
against undertaking such operations. Unless obvious
and urgent strategic interests are at stake, Congress
and the American people have usually not supported
intervention. Even when public opinion favored getting involved, support waned as costs rose and casualties mounted. American Presidents have thus been
understandably wary of intervening in the domestic
affairs of a sovereign state unless clearly discernible
U.S. interests were at stake and/or the intervention
could be kept limited and so raise no serious opposition at home. Operations in the Caribbean during
the interwar period, the era of gunboat diplomacy,
followed this pattern.
The end of the Cold War, however, changed the
security environment, providing more opportunities for intervention in places far from the traditional
American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Since the end of the Cold War, American interests and sometimes American values have motivated
Presidents to intervene in places they would not previously have gone. U.S. forces have alleviated famines,
restored democracy, stopped genocide, and backed
rebels seeking to overthrow a brutal dictator. While
many of these operations were unpopular at the time,
the White House overcame domestic opposition and
saw most missions through to a successful conclusion.
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Success does not mean, however, that the missions
proceeded smoothly. Mistakes proved costly in both
lives and money.
The likelihood that the United States will intervene somewhere in the foreseeable future requires
that these mistakes be identified and corrected. This
Letort Paper examines U.S. interventions over the past
20 years, a new era of interventionism in which missions were larger and took place much farther afield
than previously, in order to identify best practices and
common errors. Using a broad analytical framework,
the author identifies patterns and derives lessons from
past campaigns in hopes of improving the conduct of
future ones. This Paper should be of value to strategists and policymakers alike.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has intervened in the affairs of sovereign states on several occasions by using military force. A combination
of humanitarian sentiments and practical policy considerations motivated both Democratic and Republican presidents to become involved in civil wars and
humanitarian crises. These interventions met with
mixed results, and even the most successful missions
encountered serious problems. Improving the conduct of such interventions requires understanding
these past operations as well as considering conflicts
in which the United States chose not to intervene.
This Letort Paper covers U.S. military interventions in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War.
It defines intervention as the use of military force to
achieve a specific objective (i.e., deliver humanitarian aid, support revolutionaries or insurgents, protect a threatened population, etc.) and focuses on the
phase of the intervention in which kinetic operations
occurred. The Paper considers five conflicts in which
the United States intervened: Somalia (1992-93), Haiti
(1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011).
It also reviews two crises in which Washington might
have intervened but chose not to: Rwanda (1994) and
Syria (2011-12). The author examines each case using
five broad analytical questions: 1. Could the intervention have achieved its objective at an acceptable cost
in blood and treasure? 2. What policy considerations
prompted the intervention? 3. How did the United
States intervene? 4. Was the intervention followed by
a Phase 4 stability operation? and 5. Did Washington
have a viable exit strategy?
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Answering these questions reveals distinct patterns in U.S. interventions. Despite their frequent
reference to American values, Presidents have rarely
intervened on purely humanitarian grounds. Some
strategic interest usually underlay even the most
seemingly altruistic missions. Although they had the
means to intervene unilaterally, every administration
sought international approval for intervention and
usually entered a threatened state as part of a coalition, often one made up of North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Whenever possible, the United States
sought to intervene with airpower alone. It avoided
deploying ground troops, and when it did so, made
sure that those forces operated under robust rules of
engagement with rigorous force protection pursuing
limited objectives unlikely to cause casualties. A United Nations Peacekeeping Mission usually followed
American interventions, and the Pentagon always
insisted that developing a viable exit strategy be part
of the planning process for each mission, although
this requirement was not always met.
From the patterns evident in past campaigns lessons to inform the conduct of future missions can
be derived. The United States should only intervene
when doing so has a reasonable chance of success.
When intervention becomes necessary, the White
House should seek international approval and operate
as part of a coalition or alliance with airpower being
its primary contribution. If it must deploy ground
troops, it should keep the American footprint small
and withdraw forces as soon as possible.
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AVOIDING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE:
CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was but the latest
in a series of problematic humanitarian interventions
in which American forces have participated over the
past 20 years. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has intervened in Somalia (1992-93), Haiti
(1994-95), Bosnia (1995-2004), Kosovo (1999-present), and Libya (2011). In each case, the White House
waited until a crisis was well advanced, assembled or
joined a coalition of the (often reluctantly) willing, and
employed force in a tentative, circumscribed manner.
Such an approach rarely produced decisive results in a
timely fashion. Failure to clearly define mission goals
along with consistently underestimating the difficulty
of the task has often led to waste and mission creep.
Even the most recent, successful intervention in
Libya was fraught with difficulties. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign in
support of rebel ground forces succeeded in ending
Muammar Qaddafi’s reign of terror, but it took far
longer than anticipated and faced mounting opposition in the United States and abroad. The nature and
stability of the new regime over the long run will
shape conclusions about the success or failure of the
mission. The operation also raised disturbing political and moral questions. Why, critics asked, intervene
to protect innocent civilians in Libya while ignoring
their plight in Bahrain, Yemen, and especially Syria?
As the death toll in Syria rises, cries for intervention
mount matched by adamant refusals by both China
and Russia to sanction what they see as meddling in
the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Since Libya
1

has oil while Syria does not, cynics have claimed that
economic self-interest rather than humanitarian sentiment determines when and where the United States
will act.
This mixed record of U.S.-led interventions, coupled with their unpopularity at home, suggests two
options for the future: cease humanitarian intervention altogether or learn to intervene more effectively.
Given that humanitarian missions are wars of choice
fought for allegedly altruistic reasons, as opposed to
wars of necessity waged in response to a direct threat,
future administrations could refuse to get involved in
the affairs of other states, no matter how badly governments treat their own people. American history
and values, however, suggest that complete aloofness
in the face of suffering will never be established policy. We cannot intervene always and everywhere, but
we will certainly intervene at certain times and places.
Deciding where, when, and how to intervene is the
challenge all Presidents face. Such decisions may be
guided by analysis of interventions during the past
2 decades within the context of broader U.S. military
history and in light of previous studies on the subject
of military intervention.
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN U.S. HISTORY
The United States has a long history of foreign
military intervention. No sooner had the country
emerged as a player on the stage of world affairs following the Spanish American War than it began to
project power abroad. It has continued to intervene in
the affairs of foreign states ever since. The nature of
that intervention has, however, changed over the past
century. Leaving aside major conventional wars, the
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history of foreign military involvement falls roughly
into three periods: the era of gunboat diplomacy from
1900 to 1945; the era of the Cold War, 1945-89; and the
post-Cold War world, 1989 to the present. Domestic
conditions and international circumstances in each era
determined when, where, and how the United States
conducted interventions.
Era of Gunboat Diplomacy.
During the era of gunboat diplomacy, the United
States generally confined its foreign military involvement to the small, unofficial empire it had acquired
during the Spanish American War and to a self-proclaimed sphere of influence in the Caribbean and
Central America. It did, however, contribute approximately 3,500 Soldiers and Marines to a coalition suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. The U.S.
military’s first experience with modern counterinsurgency came in the Philippines. From 1899 to 1902,
American forces suppressed an insurgency through a
combination of small-unit counterguerrilla operations
and economic and political initiatives that would later
be called “winning hearts and minds.”1
While suppressing the Philippine insurrection
represented consolidating control of an American
protectorate, operations in the Caribbean and Central
America involved intervening in the affairs of sovereign states, sometimes with, sometimes without the
consent of their governments. In 1914, U.S. Marines
captured and held the Mexican city of Veracruz in
response to the arrest of American Sailors by the
city’s police. Following a raid against Columbus, New
Mexico, on March 9, 1916, by Mexican bandit/revolutionary Francisco “Poncho” Villa, President Woodrow
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Wilson sent a U.S. Army expedition across the border
to pursue him. The operation continued until February 1915, inflicting casualties on Villa’s paramilitary
organization without capturing its leader.
During the interwar period, U.S. forces also intervened in the Caribbean and Latin America. For about
a year beginning in February 1929, Marine Captain
Merritt “Red Mike” Edson conducted counterinsurgency operations against Nicaraguan revolutionary
Augusto Sandino in support of the American-backed
government in Managua. Though they failed to capture Sandino, Edson’s operations along the Rio Coco
became the stuff of Marine Corps legend, and his
writings contributed to the Corps’ Small Wars Manual.2 Desire to assure payment of debts to American
investors led to military occupation of the Dominican
Republic from 1916 to 1924.3 A combination of economic interests and desire to reduce French and German involvement in the country motivated President
Woodrow Wilson to begin an occupation of Haiti that
lasted from 1915 to 1934.4
Intervention during the era of gunboat diplomacy
generally followed a distinct pattern. All interventions, with the exception of the Boxer Rebellion, were
unilateral. With the exception of the Philippine operation conducted to secure a de facto colony acquired
after the Spanish American War and the brief mission
to China during the Boxer Rebellion, interventions
occurred within the American sphere of influence
in the Caribbean and Latin America. As the terms
“gunboat diplomacy” and “dollar diplomacy” (used
almost interchangeably during this era) suggest, the
U.S. intervened to protect American economic interests and to prevent European powers increasing their
influence in the region. The building of the Panama
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Canal increased the strategic importance of the Caribbean, whose islands the United States viewed as an
outer defense perimeter for the vital waterway. All of
these interventions, with the exception of the Philippines, involved a small number of U.S. troops from
an all-volunteer force. While policy debates occurred
around some of the interventions, none of them
became a serious public relations problem for any
administration in Washington.
The Cold War.
From 1941 to 1945, the United States was, of
course, preoccupied with World War II. The emerging
ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and later
China prevented a return to the Western Hemisphere
isolationism of the prewar period. The advent of the
Cold War began a new period of interventionism.
From 1946 to 1949, U.S. forces helped the Greek government defeat a communist insurgency using largely
conventional means.5 During the same period, American advisors aided the government of the Philippines
in suppressing the Communist Hukbalahap Revolt
(1946-54), which, like the conflict in Greece, was won
through use of superior military force.6 American
forces leading a United Nations (UN) enforcement
mission repelled a communist invasion of South
Korea in 1950 and then engaged China in a desultory
3-year war that resulted in a return to the status quo
ante. From July to October 1958, U.S. forces supported
the government of Lebanon against rebels as part of
the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” a policy of preventing
Soviet infiltration into the Middle East.7 In 1965, the
administration of Lyndon Johnson sent troops into the
Dominican Republic to help defeat an insurgency that
threatened to make the island another Cuba.8
5

Vietnam represented the largest intervention of
the Cold War. Beginning as an advisory mission in
1956, the conflict escalated to a major war, drawing in
543,000 U.S. troops, only 80,000 of whom were combat Soldiers, and eventually costing billions of dollars
and the lives of 58,000 Americans.9 Unlike any previous intervention, Vietnam was a hybrid war involving
a conventional conflict across the demilitarized zone
between North and South Vietnam and insurgency
waged in the Vietnamese countryside.10 Despite some
notable success with Combined Action Platoons to
protect local communities, Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support to win hearts and minds, and
the Phoenix program aimed at destroying the Viet
Cong leadership, the United States never mounted an
effective counterinsurgency campaign. Rising costs
and growing opposition to the war among the American public led to withdrawal in 1973, followed by the
collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 1975.
The Vietnam War did not end American interventionism during the Cold War, but it profoundly affected how intervention took place. Even before the conflict in Southeast Asia had ended, President Richard
Nixon defined a new approach to aiding threatened
governments. “We shall furnish military and economic assistance to our allies in accordance with our treaty
commitments,” the President declared in a November
3, 1969, speech on the island of Guam. “But we shall
look to the nation directly threatened to assume the
primary responsibility of providing the manpower
for its defense.”11 The Nixon doctrine developed
into what came to be called assistance for “foreign
internal defense.”12
Assistance for foreign internal defense provided
the model for a major intervention during the 1980s.
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Small teams of advisors from the Special Forces supported the government of El Salvador in its decadelong struggle against the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN), a Marxist insurgent group.
At the same time, the United States covertly supported Contra insurgents against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas fell from power,
and the Salvadoran Civil War was brought to an end
through a strategy of co-option. With American support, the Salvadoran government prevented the insurgents from seizing power, but it had to accede to some
of their demands and bring them into the legitimate
political process.13
Some larger operations still occurred during
this period. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan sent
Marines to Lebanon for what proved to be a disastrous, short-lived mission. He invaded Grenada that
same year to prevent the spread of Cuban influence in
the Caribbean, and in 1986 authorized the bombing of
Libya in retaliation for terrorist attacks in Europe. In
1989, President George H. W. Bush invaded Panama
to remove the dictator Manuel Noriega. Most of these
missions, however, involved use of conventional
forces in a short, sharp, decisive operation. When the
Marine contingent in Beirut suffered a devastating
terrorist attack, the President withdrew them almost
at once.
Cold War interventions differed markedly from
those during the era of gunboat diplomacy in one
striking respect: ideology surpassed economics as the
major reason for intervention. American Presidents
cast virtually all interventions as anti-communist crusades. They even justified interventions in the Caribbean and Latin America, Washington’s historic sphere
of influence, on altruistic grounds. “One compelling
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aspect of U.S. foreign policy during the cold war,”
Michael Butler concluded, “was the propensity of
policy makers to seek harmony between the pursuit
of security objectives and a stated American belief in
enduring values of peace and justice.”14 This altruistic
approach led to an increasing desire to clothe unilateralism in the guise of a multilateral approach. Korea
was a UN-sanctioned mission, and the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization supported the Vietnam
War. Even the intervention in the Dominican Republic enjoyed nominal support from the Organization of
American States (OAS). Concerns over unilateralism
and legitimacy may in turn have been influenced by
the greater public scrutiny of events made possible by
the advent of television.
Despite these changes, interventions during the
Cold War exhibited some consistency with those
mounted during the era of gunboat diplomacy. The
United States still showed a marked preference to send
advisors rather than combat troops. The interventions
in Greece, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Nicaragua
were conducted with small military assistance groups
or covert operatives. Even the Vietnam War began
with the U.S. military in an advisory role. In those
cases in which the United States sent in larger contingents, the White House withdrew them as quickly as
possible. Korea (defense against a conventional invasion) and Vietnam (a hybrid war) were the exceptions,
not the rule.
The Post-Cold War Era.
The opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union 2 years later profoundly
changed the international security environment in
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ways that are still playing out. The end of the Cold
War reduced the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust but
increased exponentially the risk of small wars and
insurgencies around the globe. The vacuum created by
the withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe,
Asia, and Africa, followed by a concomitant reduction
of the U.S. presence in those areas, contributed to local
and regional instability.
The increase in civil conflicts and the thaw in U.S.Russian relations created numerous opportunities
for intervention while changing the circumstances
in which interventions might occur. The end of the
Cold War deadlock in the Security Council meant that
the UN could approve more peace operations and
that the United States would be able to participate in
them. This increased ability to sanction missions created a strong impression that without UN approval,
intervention lacked legitimacy. As a result, the United
States would seek UN approval, even when it intervened in its historic sphere of influence.
Both the United States and the UN asserted their
new role in international affairs. Success in the brief,
decisive Gulf War (1991) emboldened the United States
to become involved in missions it might not otherwise
have undertaken. For its part, the UN saw an opportunity to extend peacekeeping into the realm of civil
conflict. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace declared that the era of absolute
national sovereignty had ended and made a powerful
case for humanitarian intervention.15 This statement
would provide the ideological and legal justification
for the large missions of the 1990s.
The end of the Cold War also removed a major ideological justification for intervention. Opposing the
spread of communism would no longer serve as a pre-
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text for action or a legitimate foreign policy objective.
At the same time, protecting human rights and preventing human catastrophes became valid reasons for
intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state. Naked
self-interest remained a strong motivator for action
abroad, but it had to be clothed in the guise of altruism. Coupled with a communications revolution that
created the Internet and mobile phones, this humanitarian imperative created a new challenge for Washington. Moved by heart-rending images of suffering
on television, the public might call for humanitarian
intervention. Seeing images of American casualties,
that same public might quickly demand withdrawal
of U.S. forces.
The United States thus faced a more complex security environment with many more opportunities to
intervene. At the same time, American Presidents had
to deal with a more informed public, which could constrain its ability to act. These conditions have persisted to the present and will remain for the foreseeable
future. Deciding when, where, and how to intervene
effectively will remain as a major challenge facing successive administrations. Such determination may be
facilitated by careful analysis of the interventions that
have occurred during the post-Cold War era, which
differs significantly from previous eras.
The Literature of Intervention.
Intervention during the post-Cold War era has
been the subject of considerable study. A spate of
works cover the big UN missions of the 1990s. Most of
these focus on specific conflicts, but a few broad analytical works deserve mention. Paul Diehl’s International Peacekeeping and William Durch’s The Evolution
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of UN Peacekeeping provide broad analytical studies
with analysis of comparative cases, as does Thomas
Mockaitis’ Peace Operations and Intra-state Conflict.16
A few studies have examined the generic challenges of intervention not limited to UN peace operations. Some analysts see the main problem of such
missions as maintaining domestic political support for
an intervention. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca Britton provide a thorough analysis of the impact public
opinion has had on the use of American forces abroad,
concluding that the “principal policy objective” more
than any other variable determines the level of public
support for an intervention.17 Domestic support certainly matters, but it is not the only and sometimes
not the most important variable determining success
or failure of an intervention. Popular missions have
failed and successful ones have been mounted with
limited public support. Success depends on a broad
range of factors that must be considered in order to
derive a more effective approach to intervention.
Other studies consider the effectiveness of interventions. Jun Koga has discerned the tendency of
democratic states to support threatened democracies.18 James Meernik argues that interventions to promote democracy have generally not been effective.19
Stephen Gent maintains that interventions in support
of rebels have been more effective than interventions
in support of threatened governments. He notes, however, that this divergence may be due to the timing
of interventions. The United States generally supports rebels who are growing in strength but supports
threatened governments only when they show signs of
weakness. This delay may explain why intervention to
support regimes threatened by insurgency have often
failed.20 Finally, Benjamin Fordham considers whether
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improved military capabilities increase the likelihood
that a state will mount an intervention. While he notes
some correlation between capability and the propensity to intervene, he also concludes that the increasing reliance of states on smaller professional armies
equipped with a limited number of expensive, hightech weapons mitigates this tendency.21
Another group of analysts focuses on the consequences of interventions. Jeffrey Pickering and
Emizet F. Kisangani examine the social, economic and
political impact of interventions. They find that supportive interventions in nondemocratic states tend to
strengthen autocratic rulers, and that hostile interventions weaken economic development.22 Patricia Sullivan considers the question of why powerful states
lose small wars. She concludes that victory in such
conflicts depends on two factors: capacity and resolve.
While powerful states have great capacity, they often
lack resolve because they fail to calculate the cost in
blood and treasure of winning even a limited war and
ultimately prove unwilling to pay it.
While each of these studies makes a valuable contribution to the literature of unconventional conflict,
none takes a comprehensive approach to examining
intervention as a U.S. strategic and policy issue. They
do not present an analytical framework designed to
produce guidance for policymakers and strategic
planners seeking to decide where, when, and how to
intervene. Such a framework requires consideration
of a set of interrelated questions applied to case studies from the post-Cold War world, which presents a
different set of security challenges than those faced in
previous eras.
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
For the purpose of this analysis, intervention is
defined as direct application of military force by U.S.
air and/or ground units, and the length of the intervention considered the time period in which such
kinetic operations occur. The five American-led interventions since 1989 provide a useful set of cases from
which relevant lessons may be derived. To be comprehensive, however, an investigation of this kind
must also examine conflicts during the same period
in which the United States considered intervening but
decided not to do so. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and
the 2011-12 Syrian civil war (at least to date) are such
noninterventions. Taken together, these seven cases
will be studied using an analytical framework based
upon five broad questions. First, could the intervention have achieved its objective at an acceptable
cost in blood and treasure in a reasonable amount of
time? Second, what policy considerations impacted
the decision to intervene or not to intervene? Third,
how did the United States undertake the operation?—
Did it act unilaterally or in concert with allies? Did
it employ airpower alone or use a combination of air
and ground forces?—Fourth, was the operation followed by an occupation or support mission requiring
a sustained U.S. presence? Fifth, was there a viable
exit strategy?—Did the United States have a workable
plan for disengaging its forces once it completed the
mission? These questions need to be considered not
solely as individual queries but also as an integrated
set of issues shaping U.S. policy and strategy. Applying this analytical framework to past conflicts should
make it possible to derive lessons that can help guide
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future decisions on whether or not to intervene and
improve the conduct of such interventions Washington chooses to undertake.
Somalia.
The Mission.
Altruism rarely guides foreign policy. States often
use humanitarian intervention to mask self-interested
motives. If ever there were an exception to this rule,
however, the 1992 mission to Somalia is it. Having lost
the 1992 election to Bill Clinton, President George H.
W. Bush was free to act without consideration of his
political career. No compelling foreign policy interest
dictated intervention in the Horn of Africa, and Bush
had no partisan incentive to become involved. Indeed,
a careful look at conditions in the failed state dictated
caution. In fact, he was advised not to get involved in
the country’s intractable civil war. In a biography of
her father, Doro Bush Koch, maintains that Bush had
watched images of starving Somalis for months until
he “could bear it no more.”23 In his Memoir, President
Bill Clinton acknowledges that the motives for going
to Somalia were humanitarian as does Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker.24 Philosophically, President
Bush also believed that the United States should play a
leading role in what had been dubbed “the new world
order.” Flush from its victory in the Gulf War and
having successfully mounted Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq, the
U.S. military felt confident it could accomplish most
missions in the post-Cold War world.
Somalia would put that confidence to the test. The
country of nearly 8 million people was desperately

14

poor, with 60 percent of its population engaged in
agriculture, herding, or fishing.25 Following the ouster
of hated dictator Siyadd Barre in January 1991, Somalia dissolved into civil war, fracturing along clan and
sub-clan lines. The chaos produced a massive humanitarian crisis. Between November 1991 and January
1992, 300,000 people died and another 4.5 million faced
the prospect of severe malnutrition.26 The humanitarian community poured aid into the war-torn country
but found its efforts hampered by the conflict. Relief
organizations and the Somali government, which controlled little more than a portion of the capital Mogadishu, asked for UN Assistance to protect delivery
of food.
The UN eagerly responded. Like the United States,
the international organization was experiencing a
new-found confidence as the end of the Cold War
broke the Security Council deadlock and made possible missions that would never have been approved
a few years before. The Security Council approved the
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
to support the humanitarian effort. The mission initially called for 50 military observers but was soon
expanded, first to 500 and then to 3500 troops. However, by December 1992, the UN had deployed only
564 personnel to Mogadishu and most of these troops
remained confined to base amid the deteriorating
security situation.27 Failure of the warring parties to
adhere to a ceasefire and the growing humanitarian
crisis required a more robust intervention.
President Bush decided in late November to commit 25,000 U.S. troops as the core of a 37,000-strong
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) deployed to bring some
semblance of order to the chaos in Somalia. The troops
secured the port and airport of Mogadishu and the
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ports of Baidoa and Kishmaayo. In a series of raids
and firefights UNITAF achieved dominance in its area
of operation and imposed conditions on the warring
factions embodied in U.S. force commander Robert
Johnston’s four no’s: “no technicals [pick-up trucks
with crew-serviced weapons] . . .; no banditry; no roadblocks; no visible weapons.”28 As long as the armed
groups obeyed these rules, he left them alone. In addition to a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement, success depended on cooperation between the
numerous humanitarian organizations working within the country. A Civil-Military Cooperation Center
(CMOC) in Mogadishu coordinated activities between
the military and 49 nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).29 Tensions between the Soldiers and the aid
workers remained, but cooperation improved. Military leaders also met with Somali warlords on a regular basis. These meetings reduced the number of confrontations between the two and so lowered the level
of violence in the capital. By April the famine had been
alleviated, and UNITAF was prepared to hand over
responsibility to a UN peacekeeping mission. Had the
United States chosen to withdraw completely in May
1993, the UNITAF intervention would have been seen
as a significant success.
Instead of declaring victory and going home, however, the United States agreed to contribute troops
to an ill-conceived follow-on mission that proved
disastrous. The UN Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM
II) operated under a broad and dangerously vague
mandate that it lacked the means to implement. The
enabling resolution that created the mission by augmenting UNOSOM I gave it a wider array of tasks,
including safeguarding humanitarian aid, training
national police, and promoting a stable government.
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It also emphasized “the crucial importance of disarmament.”30 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
interpreted this clause as a carte blanche to forcibly
disarm any armed group that did not voluntarily surrender its weapons. This mandate insured that rather
than being a Phase 4 stability operation, UNOSOM II
would be an armed intervention in an active civil war.
The United States contributed a much smaller contingent to UNOSOM II—3,000 support personnel and
a rapid reaction force of 1,150—not enough troops to
make a difference but enough to get the United States
embroiled in a crisis. Divided command increased
this risk. Turkish General Çevik Bir commanded the
UN Force, but the American troops remained under
U.S. operational control. The rapid reaction force
might be called upon to provide support in a crisis.
This arrangement meant that the United States would
have no control over the ill-advised policy of seizing
weapons but might be called upon to recoup a deteriorating security situation. To make matters worse,
U.S. forces in Somalia would not have all the assets,
such as armor, they might need in a crisis and would
have to ask for support from UNOSOM II.
Trying to enforce an expanded mandate with a
weaker contingent soon led to disaster. On June 5,
1993, Somali fighters belonging to the Somali National
Alliance led by warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid
ambushed Pakistani soldiers returning from a weapons search at the Mogadishu radio station. They killed
25 Pakistanis and wounded 57 others, including three
Americans from the rapid reaction force deployed
to rescue the UN contingent.31 Violence escalated
throughout the summer, and by the fall, the UN and
the United States had decided to move against Aidid. This decision led to the infamous “Black Hawk
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Down” incident. On October 3, 1993, U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force Commandos came under attack
as they returned from a raid on Aidid’s headquarters
that failed to capture the war lord. The ensuing rescue operation left 300 Somalis and 18 Americans dead,
including the helicopter pilot whose body Somalis
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in front of
TV cameras.32 The U.S. command lacked the armor
needed to rescue its Soldiers, and UNOSOM II did not
provide it in a timely manner.
The October 3 incident marked the beginning of
the end for UNOSOM II. The United States withdrew
its forces by the end of the year, and the mission
languished until it was withdrawn in March 1995.
The UN intervention failed to accomplish any of its
goals. In fact, its presence contributed to the loss of
life, as some peacekeepers and many more Somalis
died, particularly during the withdrawal, Operation
UNITED SHIELD.
The Assessment.
Viewed as a single mission, the Somalia intervention failed. Despite alleviating famine, it did nothing to bring peace and stability to the country. Warring factions continue to battle for control of what
has become the quintessential failed state. Interventions by Ethiopia, the African Union, and Kenya
have failed to restore order throughout the country.
Today Somalia hosts the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab,
a source of regional instability and international terrorism. For purposes of analysis, however, it makes
sense to consider UNITAF and UNOSOM II as two
separate enforcement operations. Considered in light
of the five questions posed by this examination, the
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American-led mission comes off much better than its
UN successor.
As already noted, the Bush White House intervened in Somalia for altruistic reasons rather than
out of strategic self-interest. The intervention had a
reasonable chance to alleviate the famine. Operation
RESTORE HOPE (the U.S. name for the UNITAF mission) adopted a highly focused, eminently achievable goal: safeguarding delivery of humanitarian aid.
American forces secured ports, cleared armed groups
from the streets of Mogadishu, and protected humanitarian organizations. They assiduously refused to
take sides in the internecine struggle despite pressure
from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
to do so. The means employed suited the ends. The
UN-approved UNITAF and participation by a coalition of nations gave it greater legitimacy than it would
have enjoyed as a purely U.S. operation. The coalition
deployed sufficient forces to achieve the limited objective. American troops operated under robust rules
of engagement but applied them in a clear, focused
manner. American forces used all available means to
protect aid shipments but did not become a player in
the civil war. The intervention did require a followon stability mission but had a clear exit strategy. Conceived as a short-term humanitarian mission, UNITAF
planned to hand-over operations to the UN within
6 months. The Bush administration and the military
command thus appear to have considered carefully all
the questions posed by this analysis.
By comparison, U.S. participation in UNISOM II
failed because it deviated from the approach taken by
its predecessor. It was a badly conceived UN enforcement operation whose goals could not be achieved at
a cost in blood and treasure acceptable to the troop-
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contributing nations, especially the United States. The
American role in the mission was ambiguous from
the start and escalated as events unfolded. While
UNITAF aimed at the limited objective of safeguarding humanitarian aid, UNISOM II took on the much
more ambitious task of disarming the warring factions and ending the civil war, yet tried to do so with a
smaller, more polyglot force than UNITAF deployed.
When it moved against Aidid, the mission became a
participant in the civil war. It also lacked the means
to achieve its objective. UNITAF had a hard core of
20,000 well-equipped U.S. troops while UNOSOM II’s
largest element was a Pakistani contingent of 4,973.33
Beyond disarming the warring factions and forcibly
ending hostilities, the UN had no precise plan for
rebuilding the country and no clear exit strategy. Even
without the disastrous October 3 incident, it is hard to
imagine how the intervention could have ended well.
Haiti.
The Mission.
Few Latin American states have had such a turbulent and tragic history as the tiny Caribbean nation of
Haiti. Crowded into an area slightly smaller than the
state of Maryland, most of the country’s 9.8 million
people live in poverty as their ancestors have done
for at least the past century.34 They have lived under
a series of dictators whose oppressive rule has been
punctuated by natural disasters and American occupations. Since gaining independence in 1804, Haiti has
had 21 constitutions and 41 heads of state, 29 of whom
were deposed or assassinated.35 The 1994 mission was
the latest in a long series of U.S. interventions, but it
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occurred under different circumstances than previous
operations. The end of the Cold War made it possible
for the United States to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, but the debacle of Somalia had soured
the American public on humanitarian intervention.
Besides a desire to relieve Haitian suffering, however, self-interest motivated the United States to intervene in Haiti. Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, Chief
of the Haitian Armed Forces, had staged a coup that
toppled President Jean Baptiste Aristide and unleashed
a reign of terror against the president’s supporters. In
the ensuing chaos, 40,000 Haitians fled abroad, many
of them arriving as illegal immigrants on the shores of
Florida.36 The refugee crisis made the Haitian problem
an American one.
President Bush responded by deporting refugees
back to Haiti, a policy for which his challenger in the
1992 presidential election Bill Clinton and human
rights groups took him to task. Once in office, though,
Clinton continued the practice in the face of equally
vociferous protest. The only other option seemed to be
regime change in Haiti. Before invading the country,
however, Clinton tried to find a diplomatic solution
to the Haitian crisis. His administration brokered the
Governor’s Island Agreement signed on July 3, 1993.
Under the terms of the agreement, the Haitian military
had promised to restore democracy, but when Haitian
mobs prevented the USS Harlan County, with its small
multinational peacekeeping force sent to implement
the Agreement, from docking at Port au Prince, it
became clear that the junta would not go quietly. “By
this time,” Clinton wrote in his memoirs, “I had been
working for a peaceful solution for 2 years, and I was
fed up.”37
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Washington pursued a two-track strategy to resolve
the Haitian crisis. As it prepared to invade Haiti, the
Clinton administration continued to work towards a
diplomatic solution that would remove Cédras and
allow a permissive entry of U.S. forces into the island
nation. The Pentagon tasked different units to prepare
for each scenario. The 82nd Airborne Division geared
up for an invasion while the 10th Mountain Division
planned for a permissive entry. The threat of force,
Clinton hoped, might be enough to convince Cédras
to relinquish power voluntarily. To make that threat
more credible and garner international support for
the mission, the United States sought UN approval for
intervening in Haiti. The Security Council called upon
member states to form a coalition, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter:
•	
to use all necessary means to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military,
•	to provide leadership consistent with the Governors Island Agreement,
•	
to facilitate the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of
the legitimate authorities of the Government of
Haiti,
•	and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement on the
understanding that the cost of implementing
this temporary operation will be borne by the
participating Member States.38
With a strong UN mandate and troops prepared
to deploy, the United States had an unbeatable diplomatic hand. On September 18, 1994, a delegation led
by former President Jimmy Carter and retired General
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Colin Powell persuaded General Cédras to leave the
island and allow the Multinational Force (MNF) (consisting almost entirely of U.S. troops) to enter Haiti.
Units of the 10th Mountain Division began deploying
as soon as the dictator left until a force of over 20,000
occupied Haiti.39 The troops disembarked without losing a single Soldier.
The mission itself went reasonably well. Contrary
to optimistic expectations, the civil police did not continue to function after the collapse of the junta. U.S.
troops were forced into a policing role for which they
were ill prepared. Initial rules of engagement (ROEs)
did not allow them use of deadly force even to stop
murders committed before their eyes. Lawless elements exploited this vacuum (a lesson apparently lost
on the planners of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), but
once the ROEs were adjusted, the situation improved
dramatically. Besides suppressing lawlessness, troops
secured the port, the capital, and other strategic points
and patrolled the countryside. They disarmed and
disbanded the Haitian Army and paramilitaries. On
March 31, 1995, U.S. forces handed over responsibility for stability operations to the UN Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH) and withdrew the bulk of their troops.
The Assessment.
By almost any measure, the U.S. intervention in
Haiti succeeded. It fulfilled every objective detailed
in the UN mandate, at least in the short run. General Cédras left the country, and President Aristide
returned. American troops provided security so that
the follow-on UN mission could work to rebuild the
police force and ensure that elections would take
place. Improved conditions stemmed the flow of refu-
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gees into south Florida. Long-term stability, which
could only be based upon economic development and
social change, has proven more elusive, but the U.S.
mission can hardly be blamed for that problem. The
analytical questions discussed here provide a framework for explaining why the intervention succeeded.
To begin with, the intervention had a focused,
achievable goal. Although the Clinton administration
did wish to alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people, it aimed first and foremost to stop Haitian refugees entering the United States. Restoring Democracy
was a means to that end, not an end in itself. Without
the refugee crisis, Washington would probably not
have intervened merely to remove a dictator, especially with the memory of Somalia still so fresh. It had
been more than willing to work with Latin American
tyrants throughout the 20th century.
The means chosen to achieve the mission also
contributed to its success. The United States had long
considered the Caribbean its backyard and could
easily have intervened unilaterally in Haiti as it had
done in the past. A multilateral approach, however,
gave the mission greater international legitimacy
and perhaps made it more palatable to an American
public soured on humanitarian intervention.40 As
Sarah Kreps has demonstrated, however, Operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was multilateral in name
only. All the planning and virtually all of the combat
troops deployed were American. The United States
thus enjoyed the legitimacy conveyed by multilateralism with few of its constraints.41 Under such circumstances coercive diplomacy backed by the threat of
overwhelming military force made permissive entry
of U.S. forces into Haiti possible.
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In addition to an achievable objective and appropriate means for achieving it, Operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY had a viable exit strategy. Washington knew from the outset that its occupation of Haiti
would be short term and that it would hand over to
a UN mission. UNMIH had actually been created in
September 1993, but the junta had prevented peacekeepers from deploying, thus necessitating the threat
of a more robust American operation. In January 1995
the Security Council extended UNMIH’s mandate for
another 6 months, allowing it to take over from the
MNF on March 31. The Security Council determined
“that a secure and stable environment, appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH as foreseen in the
above-mentioned resolution 940 (1994), now exists in
Haiti,” and that the mission could commence rebuilding the army and police.42 The United States contributed a much smaller contingent to this truly multinational mission.
Having learned from its mistakes in Somalia, the
Clinton administration considered all the relevant
issues before it intervened in Haiti. Fortunately, the
threat of force eliminated any need to actually use it.
U.S. troops conducted a short, decisive operation to
achieve a reasonable goal. The mission enjoyed international legitimacy without the constraints imposed
by alliance or coalition politics. The U.S. contingent
suffered virtually no casualties, and the last Soldier
came home before any domestic opposition to the
operation could even begin to form.
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Bosnia.
The Mission.
The United States never wished to become
involved in what analysts now call the wars of Yugoslav succession. Neither President George H. W. Bush
nor his successor, Bill Clinton, saw any compelling
reason to intervene in a violent ethnic conflict taking
place in an area with no strategic resources or compelling U.S. interests. “We don’t have a dog in this fight,”
remarked Bush’s Secretary of Defense James Baker.43
Since NATO’s European members proclaimed their
readiness to go it alone in dealing with Europe’s first
post-Cold War crisis, and the UN proved willing to
sanction a large peace operation in the Balkans, the
United States had no reason to intervene.
Neither NATO rhetoric nor UN resolutions, however, could overcome Serbia’s military advantage.
Once Slovenia successfully seceded in June 1991, Croatia and Bosnia soon followed, triggering a grab for
territory. As it controlled most of the Yugoslav military, Serbia had the upper hand. Its forces over-ran
the Serb-populated Krajina region and Eastern Slavonia, both part of Croatia. Serbia then transferred control of its military material in Bosnia to the province’s
Serb units. Paramilitaries from Serbia proper began a
brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing using rape and
murder to force Croats and Bosnian Muslims from
their homes.
The international community responded to the
escalating violence with halting, largely ineffective
steps. In September 1991, the UN imposed an arms
embargo on the belligerents.44 Then in February 1992,
the Security Council created the UN Protection Force
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(UNPROFOR) to monitor the ceasefire in Croatia, to
supervise protected areas, and to secure implementation of a peace plan worked out by UN Representative Cyrus Vance.45 Before UNPROFOR even fully
deployed, however, fighting spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a patchwork quilt of Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities with a Muslim plurality. With their
preponderance in arms, Bosnian Serb units occupied
much of the newly independent country and continued their brutal policy of ethnic cleansing. At first,
Bosnian Croats and Muslims allied to defend themselves against the Serbs but then fell to fighting each
other in a grab for territory once partition of Bosnia
seemed likely. The lightly-armed peacekeeping force
that eventually numbered 30,000 could do little to
stop the bloodshed and barely managed to protect
Muslim enclaves dubbed “safe areas” with the help of
NATO aircraft.
As violence continued throughout the next 2 years,
the balance of forces slowly shifted against the Bosnian Serbs. With the help of a private military company based in the United States, the Croats rebuilt their
small army into a formidable fighting force. Impatient
with Bosnian Serb violations of various ceasefires and
exacerbated with the failure of UNPROFOR to prevent
them, NATO deployed a more robust Rapid Reaction Force on Mount Igman above the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. The UN, however, remained reluctant to
sanction an enforcement operation, barring further
provocation from the Serbs. That provocation came in
July 1995 at the UN-declared “safe area” of Srebrenica.
Bosnian government forces had used the safe area as
an enclave from which to raid surrounding Serb territory, but withdrew as Serb forces closed in. The
withdrawal of Bosnian troops did not, however, stop
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Bosnian Serb units under General Radko Mladic from
perpetrating the worst massacre of civilians in Europe
since the end of World War II. Between July 11 and 22,
Serb forces murdered 7-8,000 men and boys, the vast
majority of them unarmed civilians.46
The UN and NATO now faced an inescapable
choice: withdraw UNPROFOR or mount a more
robust military action to stop the genocide. A July 17
internal memo from NATO headquarters in Zagreb,
Croatia discussed these options in detail. Withdrawing more than 40,000 troops from an active war zone
would be both difficult and humiliating for the NATO
alliance engaged in its first real combat mission. The
memo considered that forcing open the road to Sarajevo should be the immediate course of action, although
it had to admit that doing so would do nothing to
help the other besieged safe areas.47 Four days later,
the Contact Group of six nations formed to deal with
the Bosnian crisis gave NATO power to authorize airstrikes without UN approval.48 The allies then delivered an ultimatum to Belgrade, warning that it would
conduct airstrikes against Bosnian Serb units should
any more attacks on safe areas occur.49
During the ensuing month, several developments
tilted the balance decisively against Bosnian Serb forces. On August 4, the revamped Croat Army launched
Operation STORM and recaptured the Krajina. Director of Peacekeeping Operations (later Secretary-General) Kofi Annan ordered UNPROFOR to “intensify
measures already underway to regroup all personnel
in vulnerable positions” so that they could not be taken hostage as had occurred earlier in the year.50 Meanwhile the United States had become heavily engaged
in efforts to end the Bosnian conflict, pressuring the
government of Serbia to end its support for the Bos-

28

nian Serbs and committing military resources to an
enforcement operation, should that become necessary.
The long-expected provocation necessary for a
stronger NATO response came on August 28, when a
mortar shell landed in the Sarajevo marketplace killing
37 people. Although Bosnian Serb forces (and some
analysts) insisted that they had not fired at the city
that day, few at the time believed them. Early on the
morning of August 30, NATO aircraft began systematic bombing of Serb Army positions while the guns of
the Rapid Reaction Force lifted the siege of Sarajevo.
A month of bombing ensued during which Bosnian
government forces advanced eastward from the Bihac
pocket in northeastern Bosnia. On October 6, 1995, the
Bosnian Serbs accepted a dictated ceasefire. In December, the Dayton Peace Accords ended the war, effectively partitioning Bosnia and mandating the presence
of an International Force (IFOR) of 60,000 NATO and
partner nation troops to implement the agreement.
Although it would take another decade for the United States to disengage from Bosnia, the stabilization
missions that followed the Dayton Peace Accords did
not involve kinetic operations. Not a single American
Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine died from hostile
action during the post-conflict stabilization missions.
Assessment.
Armed intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, belated though it was, achieved its objectives of stopping
the genocide and imposing a peace accord on the
warring factions. Stabilization of the country would
take much longer, but the phase of kinetic operations
by U.S. forces was very brief. The United States provided most of the NATO airpower for the bombing
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campaign and contributed the largest contingent of
troops to IFOR. The mission suffered no combat casualties, though one soldier died in an explosion, and
thus provoked no serious opposition at home. IFOR
kept the peace, transitioned to a smaller Stabilization
Force (SFOR) in 1996, and handed over to a European
Force (EUFOR) in 2004. Again, the analytical questions herein provide a useful framework for assessing
the mission.
By August 1995 a U.S. intervention to support
NATO, with the limited objective of ending the war,
could be achieved at acceptable cost. During the previous 3 years, the United States had determined that
intervention would require too large a commitment
and carry with it too many risks. NATO estimated that
ending the war and reversing Serb advances would
have required a combat force of 150,000-460,000 troops,
half of them Americans.51 The force would have had to
engage Bosnian Serb units and would almost certainly
have suffered casualties. After the Somalia debacle,
the Clinton administration was understandably reluctant to participate in such a mission.
By the summer of 1995, however, circumstances
had changed so dramatically that a much smaller commitment of resources could be expected to achieve a
desired end state at reasonable cost with acceptable
risk. The policy debate had also shifted. The United
States still had no overwhelming strategic interest in
Bosnia per se, but it did have a strong desire to see
NATO continue as a viable military alliance. Preventing that alliance from failing in its first out of area
operation may thus have been a consideration in
Washington. Stung by criticism of its failure to stop
the Rwandan genocide, the Clinton administration
may also have felt a moral obligation to stop genocide
in the Balkans. To avoid a repeat of Somalia, however,
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the United States stuck to the narrowest definition of
its mission, enforcing the partition plan of the Dayton
Accords but refusing to implement its more problematic goals, such as pursuing indicted war criminals.
The means the Clinton administration employed
to conduct the intervention contributed to its success.
The United States intervened as part of the NATO
mission Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, with the
approval of the UN. The United States led the air campaign, while the Rapid Reaction Force used its artillery to lift the siege of Sarajevo, and Bosnian forces
advanced out of the Bihac pocket in northwest Bosnia.
American warplanes conducted the bulk of the air
attacks, flying 2,318 (65 percent) of 3,515 sorties.52 Use
of airpower had significant advantages. Overwhelming air superiority meant that U.S. forces risked few, if
any, casualties during the operation. Low risk of loss
and the short duration of the operation reduced the
likelihood of domestic opposition to the intervention.
NATO linked Operation DELIBERATE FORCE to
a diplomatic effort designed to end the conflict and
allow permissive entry of a follow-on stabilization
mission. The air campaign aimed not only to check
Bosnian Serb advances against the safe areas, but
to force the political leadership in Serbia proper to
the bargaining table. The Dayton Accords signed in
December 1995 effectively partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina, while forcing the belligerents into a reluctant
federation. The U.S. military contributed 24,000 troops
and 12,000 pieces of major equipment to Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR, its contingent in IFOR, which
consisted of approximately 60,000 NATO personnel.53
Such a large deployment, of course, carried the
risk of American casualties. The Clinton administration took two steps to reduce that risk: it imposed
rigorous force protection guidelines on all American
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units, and defined the mission very narrowly. U.S.
troops operated from within heavily defended bases
from which they ventured forth in full “battle rattle,”
creating the absurd situation of Americans in helmets
and flak jackets watching other contingents jog past
their camp in shorts and t-shirts. U.S. Forces also stuck
to the narrowest interpretation of their mission. The
Dayton Accords gave IFOR the right to:
a. monitor and help ensure compliance by all
parties with this Annex (including, in particular,
withdrawal and redeployment of Forces within
agreed periods, and the establishment of Zones of
Separation);
b. authorize and supervise the selective marking
of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone
of Separation as established by the General Framework Agreement;
c. establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international
organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of
its mission; and,
d. assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces
not transferred to the IFOR, including, if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO [United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation based in
Croatia] Forces.54
The Accords also committed IFOR to assist humanitarian organizations and, some believed, required
troop contributors to apprehend war criminals. The
U.S. contingent refused to engage in this latter task for
fear that it would bring them into violent conflict with
Bosnian Serb forces. Thus by taking no unnecessary
chances, the Clinton administration kept the risk of
casualties low.
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As Washington found once again, however, getting out of a country is much more difficult than getting in to it. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the
conflict, but everyone realized that they would have
to be implemented by a substantial military force. In
his memoirs, President Clinton acknowledges that the
American public still opposed sending ground troops
to Bosnia, and the Pentagon was ambivalent about the
prospect.55 Even the President’s allies in Congress lent
their support only on the condition that the mission
had a viable exit strategy.56
Whatever he may have promised at the time, the
U.S. deployment lasted longer than Clinton intended.
In December 1996, IFOR was replaced by SFOR with
about half the number of U.S. troops. This troop reduction did not, however, mollify critics who claimed
that the administration still had no exit strategy for
its Bosnia mission. The following year, a New York
Times editorial criticized Clinton for what was looking more and more like an open-ended commitment.
“Everyone wants a unified, democratic and prospering Bosnia,” the opinion piece concluded. “But Congressional Republicans are right to warn that American Soldiers cannot remain deployed until that goal is
fully achieved.”57 It would take another 8 years before
SFOR handed over to EUFOR, and the United States
withdrew all but a small contingent from Bosnia.
Criticism over lack of an exit strategy does not,
however, seem to have hampered President Clinton’s
ability to conduct the Bosnia mission, perhaps because
it never escalated to a popular out-cry to bring the
troops home. Clinton claimed that the real problem
the deployment posed had to do with justifying its
expense to Congress.58 Complete absence of combat
operations, let alone casualties, may explain why
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the mission produced no serious opposition at home
during the 8 years American troops deployed to Bosnia. In the 2000 presidential election, then-Governor
George W. Bush campaigned against using U.S forces
for nation-building, but once in office he did not withdraw the U.S. contingents from Bosnia or Kosovo.
The U.S. intervention in Bosnia clearly achieved
its goals, however modest those goals may have been.
Along with its NATO allies, U.S. forces stopped the
genocide, imposed a peace settlement, and stabilized
Bosnia-Herzegovina through disarmament, demining, humanitarian assistance, and policing. Tragically,
conditions for a successful intervention may have
existed as early as 1992, and had such an intervention
occurred then, it would have saved tens of thousands
of lives. That sad fact does not, however, diminish the
success of the 1995 mission. Today the Bosnian Federation remains a peaceful but fragile state in continuing need of foreign aid, but the chances of renewed
conflict in the foreseeable future remain low.
The ability of the Clinton administration to provide satisfactory answers to only four of the five analytical questions posed by this Paper reveals a great
deal about the conditions necessary for successful
intervention. Despite the emphasis of policymakers
and strategists on the need to have a clear exit strategy before mounting an intervention, the Bosnian case
demonstrates that the absence of such a strategy does
not preclude an intervention or consign it to failure.
Critics chided the President for not stating how and
when he planned to withdraw from IFOR/SFOR, but
such criticism never reached a level high enough to
affect policy. Compared with the Somalia debacle, the
Bosnian mission suggests that lack of an exit strategy
only becomes a serious problem when combined with
rising casualties.
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Kosovo.
The Mission.
The Kosovo conflict was the last of the wars of
Yugoslav succession. Ironically, the chain of events
that led to these wars began and ended in Kosovo. The
southern province of Serbia, with its Muslim majority, had enjoyed autonomy in Tito’s Yugoslavia. In
1989, however, during the 600th anniversary of the
Battle of Kosovo Polje, in which Serbian Prince Lazar
died fighting the Turks, Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milošević revoked that autonomy. Milošević persecuted Kosovo’s two million Albanians (86 percent of
its population) while privileging a Serbian minority
(10 percent of the population).59 For the next decade,
Kosovars suffered systematic discrimination in all
areas of economic and social life.
With no resources and little outside support, the
Kosovars could not challenge the vastly superior
Serbian-dominated Yugoslav security forces. They
opted instead for passive resistance, creating a parallel “state” that provided basic education, health care,
and even a sports program to meet the needs of their
people, while biding their time until their political
fortunes improved.60 The situation in Kosovo changed
dramatically in 1997. The government of neighboring Albania collapsed, losing control of some of its
weapons depots. A radical fringe group, the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), exploited the situation by
importing guns across the largely open border with
Albania and launching an insurgency against the Serbian government. They adopted a classic guerrilla
strategy, attacking police and government officials to
provoke the security forces into over-reacting. They
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hoped this approach might draw international attention to their cause. The strategy worked brilliantly.61
In the fall of 1997, Belgrade sent in regular army units
to clear the central Drenica region of insurgents. The
troops killed 136 people, including 11 children and 23
women, and sparked an exodus of 250,000 Kosovar
Albanians.62 The violence continued throughout 1998,
and all efforts to reach a diplomatic solution failed. On
March 23, 1999, the United States led a 78-day bombing campaign that forced Serbia to withdraw its forces
from Kosovo.
A NATO peacekeeping mission numbering close
to 50,000 troops dubbed “Kosovo Force” (KFOR)
deployed to help implement the peace agreement and
rebuild the war-torn province. That force, albeit much
reduced in number, remains to this day providing
security to Kosovo, which declared its independence
in February 2008. Despite the seemingly open-ended
nature of the U.S. commitment to the tiny country,
criticism of the mission never reached the levels it had
with Bosnia, although George W. Bush campaigned on
a promise to avoid future nation-building missions. A
number of factors explain the absence of any serious
demand to bring the troops home. To begin with, the
United States contributed far fewer Soldiers to KFOR
than it had to IFOR. Task Force Falcon consisted of just
8,453 troops occupying one of the quietest sectors in
the province.63 Their numbers steadily declined to the
current strength of 781.64 As with the Bosnia mission,
troops engaged in no combat operations and suffered
no casualties from violence. A 2003 Rand Corporation Report described the Kosovo intervention as “the
best managed of the U.S. post–Cold War ventures in
nation-building.”65 More than anything else, however,
the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks followed by the
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invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq almost completely
eclipsed the small operation in the Balkans.
Analysis.
The Kosovo intervention proved highly successful. A large-scale NATO/UN mission followed the
air campaign and stabilized Kosovo, creating a safe
environment for a massive humanitarian aid effort.
Albanian refugees returned en-mass, but most Serbians and Roma (Gypsies), fearful of reprisals, did not.
Efforts to reintegrate Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia failed. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo
declared independence. The United States and most
of its NATO allies have recognized the new country,
while Russia, China, and, of course, Serbia have not. A
token military presence backed up by the might of the
NATO alliance guarantees Kosovo’s security, but the
tiny state remains dependent upon foreign aid. The
success of the mission may be explained by considering the analytical questions of this Paper.
The U.S.-led intervention succeeded largely
because its goals were achievable. Neither the United
States nor its NATO allies sought to create an independent Kosovo. They aimed first and foremost to stop
the ethnic cleansing (expulsion of non-Serbians) and
prevent the regional destabilization the refugee crisis
threatened to cause. Hoping that the province could
be reintegrated with Serbia, NATO forces worked to
assist return of Serbian refugees, and only reluctantly
supported the province’s independence. Intervention carried little risk of escalation as Russia, Serbia’s
historic protector, showed no strong inclination to
back it over Kosovo and even encouraged Serbian
President Slobodan Milošević to come to terms with
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NATO. Russian forces briefly occupied the Pristina
airport, but that episode had more to do with Russian
domestic politics and a demand for inclusion in the
follow-on mission than with trying to prevent it from
taking place.66 In any event, the willingness of NATO
member Hungary and NATO aspirants Romania and
Bulgaria to close their airspace to Russian aircraft precluded further action by Moscow.
The formulation of U.S. policy towards Kosovo evolved over time, but the goals of that policy
remained consistent. The United States did not want
a Kosovar refugee crisis destabilizing the surrounding states, and to that end, it favored restoration of
the province’s autonomy.67Although it had no desire
to go to war over Kosovo, Washington had remained
committed to curbing Serbian excesses in the province
since it first threatened use of force to stop them. On
December 25, 1992, President George H. W. Bush had
sent the “Christmas warning” to Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milošević: “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be
prepared to employ military force against the Serbians
in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.”68 The Clinton administration took the same position, reiterating Bush’s
warning in February 1993 and June 1998, as the crisis
in the province worsened. “I am determined to do all
I can to stop a repeat of the human carnage in Bosnia
and the ‘ethnic cleansing’,” Clinton declared. “And I
have authorized, and I am supporting, an accelerated
planning process for NATO.”69 Despite its willingness to use force, however, the White House sought
a diplomatic solution via the Rambouillet Peace Conference. Only when that peace process failed, did the
United States lead the alliance into war.
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The means by which the United States conducted
the Kosovo intervention also evolved. Alliances often
produce least-common-denominator strategy, with
the most reluctant members setting the pace of operations. In this case, the United States was one of the
reluctant members of NATO. Although the UN condemned Serbian atrocities against Kosovar Albanians,
it imposed a (largely meaningless) arms embargo on
Yugoslavia (now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro)
and threatened further measures if the Milošević
regime did not comply with its demands. The Security Council fell short of approving armed intervention
because of a threatened Russian veto. Believing that it
had a strong moral argument and considerable international support and calculating that Russia could
do little more than protest, the Clinton administration decided to lead NATO into its first war against
a sovereign state. Stung by the experience of Somalia,
however, the White House joined those allies opposed
to a ground invasion. The United Kingdom (UK)
unconditionally favored use of ground troops, France
supported their use with UN approval, and Italy and
Germany opposed ground action entirely.70
Under the circumstances, an air campaign, which
most analysts believed would be short and decisive,
seemed the best option. In his address to the nation at
the start of hostilities, however, the President made a
statement that reduced the likelihood that the bombing would promptly resolve the situation. By announcing that air strikes would be directed at Serb forces
in Kosovo and declaring emphatically that he did not
“intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,”
he essentially told the Serbs that they could disperse
their tanks and other equipment, making it harder to
destroy them from the air.71 The tentative nature of
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military action encouraged Milošević to believe that
NATO would not remain unified enough to sustain a
long air war. He might have been right were it not for
another line in Clinton’s speech, which he apparently
missed. “Imagine what would happen if we and our
allies instead decided just to look the other way, as
these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep,”
the President asserted. “That would discredit NATO,
the cornerstone on which our security has rested for
50 years now.”72 The credibility of NATO and perhaps even its survival were at stake. This realization
strengthened, rather than weakened, the resolve of
the alliance.
As the campaign unfolded, NATO increased its
pressure on Serbia. When bombing targets in Kosovo
failed to produce results, the alliance attacked Serbia
proper. Although the allies disagreed on target selection during the initial phase of operations, by the time
of the NATO Summit in April, they had become more
focused in their objectives and unified in their effort.73
Once again, the United States provided most of the
assets for the air campaign, flying 5,035 strike sorties,
53 percent of the total.74 All the states surrounding Serbia were either NATO members or aspired to membership, and so they cooperated in isolating Milošević. By
June 1999, the alliance had built up ground forces on
the Albanian and Macedonian borders and was discussing an invasion. With American help, the KLA had
developed its capabilities to the point where the Serbian army had to concentrate troops and equipment to
combat the insurgents, thus making its units vulnerable to air attack. This threat, coupled with Moscow
pressuring him to give up, probably led Milošević to
capitulate on June 9.75 The 78-day NATO war was thus
an example of effective coercive diplomacy in which
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military action, combined with diplomatic pressure,
forced the Serbian president to withdraw his forces
from Kosovo, allowing permissive entry of KFOR into
the province.76
The NATO air campaign thus paved the way for a
follow-on mission to provide security, deliver humanitarian aid, and rebuild civil institutions. Because of the
bad experience they had in Bosnia, NATO forces did
not wish to be under direct UN control, so the Security Council approved a dual mission. Resolution 1244
authorized “Member States and relevant international
organizations to establish the international security
presence in Kosovo.”77 That authorization allowed
NATO to deploy KFOR, comprised of close to 50,000
troops derived primarily from member countries augmented by Partnership for Peace nations, including
the Russian Federation.78 The same resolution created
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to handle the
civil and political side of the intervention.
The United States managed its military commitment to KFOR very tightly. The 8,453-strong U.S.
contingent operated under robust rules of engagement and stringent force protection guidelines that
virtually eliminated the threat of casualties from hostile action.79 While the White House remained committed to staying in Kosovo for an extended period
of time, it planned to reduce its troop strength to a
bare minimum as soon as possible. The 781 troops currently deployed to the mission represent a symbolic
commitment to defending Kosovo’s independence, a
confidence-building measure that represents no serious drain on American military resources.80
The U.S.-led intervention accomplished its goal of
stopping Serbian aggression against Kosovar Alba-
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nians, preventing the refugee crisis from destabilizing
the region, and assuring the continued viability and
relevance of NATO. Clinton’s announcement that no
ground troops would invade Kosovo hampered the
air campaign, which took much longer than anticipated to achieve results. Thousands of Kosovars suffered
and died as a result. The Clinton administration may,
however, have mounted the only mission that the U.S.
Congress and the American public would tolerate. It
certainly accomplished its objective with minimal loss
of U.S. lives and at an acceptable cost.
As was the case with the Bosnia crisis, the United
States did not have a clear exit strategy, but lack of one
did not hamper operations. It might also be argued
that the military means used to mount the intervention
did not produce the best result in the timeliest manner. Taking the threat of ground action off the table
allowed the Serbs to disperse their forces, making them
harder to destroy. The additional time needed to force
Milošević to surrender resulted in considerable suffering among the very people the United States wished
to help. However, the Clinton administration believed
that a limited air campaign was the least-commondenominator strategy that the NATO alliance would
support, and it did ultimately work. Whether the
means employed will have been deemed appropriate
depends on the outcome of the mission, which cannot be foreseen at the outset. Policymakers have little
choice but to achieve a compromise between the most
desirable and the best available means to intervene
and hope for the best.
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Libya.
The Mission.
The civil war that eventually drew in the United
States and its NATO allies began on February 15,
2011, with an uprising in the eastern city of Benghazi.
Inspired by the Arab Spring, which had toppled totalitarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the rebels sought
to remove Muammar Qaddafi from power. Although
they enjoyed some early victories, the poorly trained
and very disunified opposition faltered before Libya’s
regular armed forces. Qaddafi unleashed a reign of
terror, attacking civilians as well as rebel fighters.
Led by France, Britain, and the United States, a
coalition of nations sought to halt the violence. After
the Arab League and the Secretary General of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned
attacks upon civilians in Libya, the UN Security
Council took up the matter. Resolution 1970 deplored
“the gross and systematic violation of human rights,
including the repression of peaceful demonstrators,”
expressed “deep concern at the deaths of civilians,”
and rejected “unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made
from the highest level of the Libyan government.”81
The resolution imposed an arms embargo and travel
ban on the country and froze Qaddafi’s assets abroad.
Economic and diplomatic pressure had no effect on
the dictator, who stepped up his attacks using aircraft
to bomb rebel held towns and cities. In response the
Security Council sanctioned limited military action
to protect civilians. Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly
zone over Libya and authorized:
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Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations
or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the
Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation
force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.82

The resolution used language sufficiently ambiguous to allow different interpretations. Believing that it
authorized little more than a no-fly zone over eastern
Libya, Russia and China allowed the motion to pass
by abstaining. “We believe that the interference of the
coalition into the internal, civil war in Libya has not
been sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council resolution,” Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov later declared.83 The United States, France, Italy, and the UK, however, interpreted the phrase “all
necessary measures” broadly. They moved beyond
enforcing a no-fly zone to striking at government
forces and installations, supplied the rebels with arms
(UK and France), and even inserted covert operatives
to gather intelligence (the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA]).
The air campaign lasted approximately 6 months.
From March 19-31, the United States led Operation
ODYSSEY DAWN, after which NATO took over
command and continued the campaign until October 20. Although more than 18 nations contributed
military assets to the mission, four conducted most
of the attacks: the United States (2,000), Great Britain
(1,300), France (1,200), and Italy (600).84 The air campaign combined with aid to the rebels achieved decisive results without the loss of a single NATO soldier,
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sailor, or airman. By the end of August, the rebels controlled Tripoli, and the last regime stronghold of Sirte
fell on October 20. During the final days of the campaign, rebel fighters found and summarily executed
Muammar Qaddafi.
Analysis.
The Libyan intervention achieved the immediate goal of helping the rebels to overthrow Qaddafi.
Since the United States did not participate in a Phase
4 stability operation, it incurred none of the costs and
faced none of the criticisms common to the Somalia
and Balkan missions. Whether the intervention will be
deemed effective depends on how events play out in
Libya. If an anti-Western Islamist government gains
power, many will question the wisdom of backing the
rebels. If the new regime enjoys good relations with
Washington, London, and Paris, then few will question President Obama’s decision to get involved. So
far the signs from Tripoli have been mixed. Fair and
free elections have taken place, Libyan oil is flowing
again, and Western engagement is helping to rebuild
the country. The murder of the U.S. Ambassador in
Benghazi in September 2012, however, reveals the
fragile state of the country. As of this writing, the new
government is barely 1 year old, so it is far too early
to tell how things will turn out. Russia’s determination to block intervention in Syria must, however, be
considered an unintended negative consequence of
the Libyan mission. The Libyan intervention can be
assessed by answering analytical questions posed by
this analysis.
The question of whether or not the intervention
could achieve its goal seems clear in retrospect, but it
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was not so clear at the outset of the operation. However, Gent’s conclusion that supporting rebels who
are gaining strength usually succeeds suggests that
the administration was backing the winning horse.85
As commentators noted at the time, imposing a no-fly
zone would require offensive military action. Besides
violating the airspace of a sovereign state, it requires
destroying that state’s air defense system (aircraft, missiles, radar installations, etc.). “Let’s just call a spade
a spade,” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told Congress. “A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya
to destroy the air defenses.”86 Although the United
States and its allies could easily impose a no-fly zone,
whether doing so would actually protect civilians
remained unclear. The experience of Kosovo showed
that without threat of a ground invasion, a regime can
disperse and disguise its forces. Lacking unity, training, and equipment, the Libyan opposition hardly
seemed capable of standing up to Qaddafi’s troops
even if the regime could no longer attack rebels from
the air. Policymakers feared mission creep leading to
a ground war, a backlash against the United States
in the Arab world, and the possibility of Islamists
controlling post-war Libya. All of these factors led
journalist Matt Gurney to proclaim in a February
24 editorial titled (ironically as it turned out), “Why
America won’t bomb Libya” that “the imposition of a
no-fly zone is unlikely to happen unless the situation
in Libya worsens dramatically. Taking on the mission
entails too much downside for the nations that would
have to be involved.”87 The situation did worsen, but
so had the situations in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria,
where the United States did not get involved.
Why, then, did the Obama administration decide
to intervene in the Libyan civil war? In an address
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to the nation from the National Defense University
on March 28, 2011, the President cited humanitarian reasons for intervening, foremost among them
desire to prevent a massacre of civilians in Benghazi.88
Despite concern for the well-being of Libyan civilians, the Obama administration remained reluctant
to intervene militarily in Libya and did so only at the
request of the Arab League, with UN approval and
at the urging of France and Britain.89 A desire to support NATO allies, which had supported the United
States over the years, may thus have influenced the
President’s thinking.
Of the two countries sounding the drum beat for
intervention France had the greatest strategic interest in Libya. “Europe is in the frontline” facing the
upheaval in North Africa, French President Nicolas
Sarkozy stated. He added that the continent could not
ignore “important migratory movements,” an oblique
reference to Libyan refugees fleeing to Europe.90 Sarkozy may also have been motivated by his desire to see
France play a leading role in international affairs and
a wish to give his sagging approval ratings at home
a boost.91 Britain had no immediate strategic interest
in Libya, and Prime Minister David Cameron needed
no increase in his popularity. Like his French counterpart, however, Cameron may simply have wished to
be on the right side of history as a sea change swept
the Arab world.92 The British also had no love for
Qaddafi, who had trained and supplied members
of the Irish Republican Army during the troubles in
Northern Ireland.
By mid-March 2011, all the conditions set by President Obama for intervention had been met. The Arab
League had requested action, the UN Security Council
had passed the requisite resolution approving it, and
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Britain and France agreed to take the lead, although
everyone knew that the United States would contribute the largest percentage of assets needed for the mission. The President made clear from the outset that he
would not deploy ground troops to Libya, which the
UN resolution clearly forbade. He did, however, allow
CIA operatives to enter Libya to gather targeting intelligence for the air campaign. The British and French
supplied and probably trained the revolutionaries
and may also have had covert assets on the ground.
Even though the chances of suffering casualties in
an air campaign would be small, the mission did carry
significant political risk. As the Kosovo War had made
abundantly clear, air campaigns may take a long time
to achieve results, especially if the enemy realizes
that the nation or coalition launching it will not send
in ground forces. The longer the air campaign takes,
the more civilians, the very people, the intervention
allegedly seeks to protect, will suffer. In such a situation, the Obama administration could face the difficult
choice of being drawn into a ground war or accepting failure. Fortunately, the Libyan rebels were more
numerous and better equipped than the KLA, since
many of them had defected from the Libyan armed
forces. They also controlled the eastern port city of
Benghazi through which they could receive supplies.
It thus took less time to mold them into an effective
force capable of overthrowing Qaddafi than it might
otherwise have done. The United States thus had no
need to participate in a follow-on mission, so the exit
strategy consisted of the end of air action once its
objective had been achieved.
The Libyan mission commenced amid more uncertainty than the operations in Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo.
In terms of military assets and personnel, the United
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States risked little. There was, however, no guarantee
that an air campaign would enable the rebels to defeat
the Qaddafi regime. The intervention carried significant political risk, especially during an election year.
Defeat of the rebels would have left the President open
to a charge of weakness, which Republican challenger
Mitt Romney leveled anyway. Success carried with it
the greater risk that the new Libyan regime would be
anti-Western. The high political risk-to-gain ratio suggests that Washington can mount a successful intervention even without a compelling political reason to
do so, provided that mission does not endanger Americans and does not last long.
NONINTERVENTIONS
A study of armed intervention requires consideration of civil conflicts in which the United States
might have intervened but chose not to do so. Four
such opportunities have occurred during the postCold War era: Rwanda (1994), Bahrain (2011), Yemen
(2011), and Syria (2011-12). The Rwandan genocide
occurred 1 year after Somalia, and the other three
conflicts began at almost the same time as the Libyan
mission. They were part of the larger upheaval known
as the Arab Spring. Each of these conflicts stood juxtaposed to a major American intervention, raising moral
and political questions as to why the United States
chose to get involved in one crisis but not another.
The cases of Bahrain and Yemen are fairly straight
forward. In Bahrain, the government did crackdown
on dissidents, but for a very short period of time and
with minimal loss of life. Reprehensible though human
rights violations by its government were, the country
never degenerated into civil war. The emirate could
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also plausibly claim that Iran had instigated the protests, which remained confined to its Shi’a population.
Conditions in Bahrain never reached anything like the
level of violence in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Libya.
Yemen is a fragile state with deep tribal divisions and
a strong al-Qaeda presence in rural areas. Intervening
there would have presented the United States with a
problem as intractable as Afghanistan. In any event,
the opposition did succeed in forcing out the president
without the need of American intervention. Rwanda
and Syria, on the other hand, were far more complex
cases requiring fuller discussion. The same analytical
questions used by this analysis to examine American
interventions can shed light on why the United States
did not intervene in these two countries.
Rwanda.
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is one of the great
tragedies of the late 20th century. A ceasefire following 3 years of civil war between the forces of the majority Hutu government and rebels from the ethnic Tutsi
minority collapsed following the death of the Hutu
president when his plane was shot down on April 6,
presumably by Tutsi rebels. Hutu extremists backed
by the army unleashed a wave of killings that took the
lives of perhaps half a million Tutsis and some 157,000
Hutus.93 The small UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) deployed under a Chapter 6 peacekeeping
mandate lacked the numbers, the equipment, and the
authority to stop the killing. UNAMIR’s request for
more troops and the freedom to use them fell on deaf
ears in New York and the Western capitals.
The Western powers in general, and the United
States in particular, have faced harsh criticism for
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their failure to intervene in the conflict. Canadian
General Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR,
has led a chorus of voices condemning western leaders for failing to stop the genocide. “Why is it that
black Africans, sitting there getting slaughtered by
the thousands, get nothing,” he asked in a PBS interview. “Why is it when a bunch of white Europeans
get slaughtered in Yugoslavia, you can’t put enough
capability in there?”94 Dallaire has insisted ever since
the tragedy unfolded that given 5,000 troops, he could
have stopped the genocide. His assessment distorts
American motives, grossly oversimplifies the situation as it unfolded in Rwanda during April and May
of 1994, and is not entirely consistent with his own
perceptions of events at the time.
The charge of indifference to African suffering
based on racism does not hold up under close scrutiny. The United States had just led a massive intervention in Somalia motivated by nothing more than
humanitarian concern. It also spent $43 million on
humanitarian aid to Rwanda refugees after the conflict ended.95 As for the UN, its largest mission prior to
Bosnia was the 1960 intervention in the Congo. Contrary to Dallaire’s assertion, the Clinton administration had not been eager to get involved in Yugoslavia,
where it intervened only in the last few months of the
conflict, long after most victims of that genocide were
dead. Even then, American motives were not purely
humanitarian, but also strategic. The United States
was not averse to helping Africans, but it was leery of
committing ground forces to intervene in a civil war.
Airpower would have been useless in the face of mass
killing by small groups dispersed throughout rural
areas. The claim that the genocide could have been
prevented with a prompt deployment of 5000 troops

51

has also been challenged.96 This conclusion rests
on three questionable assumptions: that the United
States knew genocide was unfolding in time to stop
it, that 5,000 Soldiers would have been sufficient to
stop the killing, and that these troops could have been
deployed soon enough to have had a decisive effect.
Alan Kuperman argues quite persuasively that
President Clinton could not have known that the killing in Rwanda amounted to genocide until April 20
at the earliest, by which time perhaps 250,000 people were already dead.97 UN documents and media
accounts support Kuperman’s conclusion. In his April
20 report to the Security Council on the activities of
UNAMIR, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
noted that the death of the Rwandan president had
provoked widespread killing “mainly in Kigali” and
concluded that: “No reliable estimate of deaths has so
far been available, but they could possibly number tens
of thousands.”98 The report grossly underestimated
the death toll and focused on the capital, where only 4
percent of Rwandans lived. On May 13, Boutros-Ghali
submitted another report to the Security Council,
describing the situation in Rwanda as a “civil conflict”
and focusing on the refugee crisis it created, not on
mass killing.99 Newsweek also described the conflict as
a civil war, albeit one in which armed gangs murdered
civilians, but not one of systematic genocide by one
group against another.100 The article quotes Dallaire:
“If we spend another three weeks cooped up here
watching them pound each other, we’ll have to reassess [whether to stay].”101 Dallaire’s choice of words
suggests that he, too, viewed the struggle as a civil
war and even seems to have considered withdrawal
of the mission.
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Whatever they thought in April, by mid-May neither the UN nor western leaders could deny that Hutus
were murdering Tutsi men, women, and children on a
large scale. Once world leaders realized that genocide
was occurring, the next two questions raised by critics of nonintervention become pertinent: would 5,000
troops have stopped the killing, and could they have
been deployed in time to do so? Kuperman argues
persuasively that 5,000 adequately equipped solders
with the necessary logistic support could not have
deployed in less than a few weeks, and that while this
deployment might have stabilized Kigali, it could not
have stopped most of the killing in the countryside,
where more than 90 percent of Rwandans lived.102
Even he admits, however, that timely intervention
could have saved perhaps 125,000 people.103
Considering whether American intervention could
have saved 125,000 victims or stopped the genocide
entirely, still leaves unanswered the question of why
the Clinton administration chose not to get involved
in Rwanda, while intervening in Haiti the same year
and Bosnia the following. The disaster of Somali offers
part of the explanation. Since Vietnam, the United
States had avoided intervening with ground forces in
civil conflicts with the exception of El Salvador, where
it deployed only a small number of advisors. In the
context of the post-Vietnam era, Somalia, not Rwanda,
is the outlier. Embarrassment over failure to intervene
in Rwanda may also explain the increased willingness
to go to Bosnia and Kosovo, as the African tragedy
spurred a new American consciousness of the need to
prevent and/or halt genocide.104
The analytical framework of this analysis provides
a compelling argument as to why the United States
did not intervene in Rwanda. No compelling U.S.
interests were at stake. The Clinton administration
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did not have the means to stop the genocide, which
was well underway before Washington even knew it
was occurring. Deploying troops to the capital would
certainly have saved some lives, but most of the killing took place in the countryside. To occupy all the
affected areas would have required far more troops
than Dallaire believed and would have embroiled the
United States in a situation much like Somalia without
a clear exit strategy.
Syria.
The Syrian civil war began as a series of protests
in Deraa in March 2011, sparked by the upheaval
in Tunisia the previous month. When protesters
demanding democratic reform faced repression by
the Syrian army, unrest spread to other cities and initiated an increasing cycle of violence. Members of the
armed forces and the civilian government defected
to the opposition, whose demands had escalated to
removing President Bashar al-Assad from power. The
disparate elements of the opposition formed the Syrian National Council and insurgent military forces
coalesced into the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA
is not a coherent fighting force but an umbrella organization of militias and paramilitary organizations of
very uneven quality.105 Conservative estimates number the FSA at 7,000 fighters, whose weapons come
from Syrian military defectors and black-market arms
sales via Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey.106
Fighting has taken the form of ambushes, street
battles, and guerrilla warfare, with the FSA liberating neighborhoods and even entire towns. Assad has
responded with indiscriminate shelling, air attacks
and brutal reprisals against entire communities. The
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civil war also has an ethnic dimension, as FSA fighters
belong to the Sunni majority, and government forces,
particularly the ruthless paramilitary groups, come
from Assad’s Allawi Shi’a Sect. By late July 2012, the
death toll had exceeded 19,000, most of them civilians
killed by government forces.107 On August 15, 2012,
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported the
number of refugees fleeing the conflict at 155,753.108
Since this number does not include internally displaced persons or unregistered refugees, the number
of people driven from their homes by the fighting is
probably much higher.
The Syrian Civil War has many of the characteristics and conditions that drew the United States and
its allies into Libya. Nonetheless, the Obama administration has confined its efforts to demanding Assad
relinquish power and calling for UN sanctions, which
Russia and China consistently block. Lack of a UN
resolution approving intervention is most often stated
as the reason for inaction. Since the absence of such
approval did not stop President Clinton from intervening in Kosovo, however, American reluctance
must be in part ascribed to other factors. Because the
conflict in Syria is still unfolding, however, assessing
the motives of the Obama administration for not intervening in it requires speculation.
Some conclusions can, nonetheless, be drawn with
confidence. Embarking on a risky foreign policy venture during a presidential election is almost always a
bad idea. George H. W. Bush only intervened in Somalia after he had lost the 1992 election. Obama’s willingness to tackle health care reform and authorize a raid
on Osama bin Laden’s hideout deep in Pakistan demonstrates his willingness to take risks. Absent other
inhibiting factors, he might have chanced intervening
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in Syria by using airpower as he had done in Libya,
but he was not about to do so during a close re-election campaign. His re-election has lessened partisan
concerns, but has not removed the other impediments
to intervention.
Unlike the Libyan civil war, the Syrian conflict
presents a complex problem in a volatile region of the
world. Missteps in the Middle East can have far more
serious consequences than could those in North Africa
or the Balkans. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States back
the rebels, as does Turkey. Iran sides with Syria, which
also enjoys support from Russia. Israel has no love for
the Damascus regime but wonders whether the devil
it knows might not be better than the one it does not.
The Assad family has, after all, kept Syria's border with
Israel quiet for decades, even if they have also supported Hezbollah. The prospect of an Islamist regime
ruling Syria combined with the new, less friendly one
in Egypt makes Israel nervous. Uncertainty over the
nature and stability of post-Assad Syria also bothers
Washington, especially since opposition leaders have
failed to guarantee that Islamists would not be part of
any new government.109 Anxiety increased in August
2012 when reports of al-Qaeda and other extremist
groups aiding Syrian rebels surfaced.110 These reports
confirmed fears Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had
expressed earlier in the year. “We have a very dangerous set of actors in the region,” she told BBC news
in February, “Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and those who are
on our terrorist list, to be sure, supporting—claiming to support the opposition.”111 Fear that weapons
supplied to the FSA might fall into the hands of terrorists has made the administration wary of arming
them. Washington also fears that supplying weapons
to the opposition might induce Russia and/or Iran
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to counter with more aid to the regime, thus escalating the civil war and increasing the suffering and loss
of life.112
For all these reasons, the United States has
eschewed direct involvement in the Syrian civil war
and, barring some unforeseen change in circumstances, will probably continue to do so. In the unlikely
event that Vladimir Putin withdraws his support
for Assad, the United States might be able to get UN
approval for a no-fly zone to protect Syrian civilians,
although it is unlikely that the Russians or the Chinese would allow such a mission to escalate into providing air cover for the rebels as happened in Libya.
Should Iran become directly involved by sending
military personnel into Syria to support the regime,
the United States might perceive an existential threat
to Israel and intervene unilaterally. Despite declaring
that the use of chemical weapons represented a red
line that Damascus dare not cross, Obama did not act
on reports in April 2013 that Assad had made limited
use of sarin gas. In all probability, the conflict will be
resolved by the Syrians themselves with no probable
outcome particularly favorable to Western interests.
Any regime that replaces Assad will no doubt bitterly
resent America’s failure to support the revolution. If
Assad wins, his weakened regime will depend even
more on Iran. Neither of these scenarios bodes well for
regional stability.
PATTERNS AND POSSIBILITIES
The cases examined herein reveal broad patterns
from which specific recommendations about the
nature and conduct of interventions might be derived.
Properly applied, these lessons might offer some

57

guidance on when and how to conduct interventions.
Past campaigns cannot, however, provide a blueprint
for future ones. History offers lessons, but it does not,
contrary to the popular cliché, repeat itself. Those lessons must be learned and creatively applied to each
new situation.
Where to Intervene.
Democratic and Republican Presidents have insisted that American values as well as political interests
shape U.S. foreign policy. This claim has been a cornerstone of political discourse for much of the Republic’s history. The United States has developed its own
unique version of just war theory, claiming since the
early 19th century that wars, even wars of conquest,
must “liberate the oppressed and expand the sphere
of freedom.”113 The cases examined here, however,
suggest that values alone rarely provide sufficient
incentive for intervention. Only in the case of Somalia
can it be argued that humanitarian motives alone persuaded the White House to intervene. As a lame-duck
President, George H. W. Bush had the luxury of acting purely on principle. Not only did that operation
end very badly, but its failure cast a very long shadow. The Somalia debacle probably affected the decision to stay out of Rwanda, where humanitarianism
alone would have compelled intervention, and may
have delayed intervention in Bosnia. Presidents may,
however, mount limited humanitarian interventions
using military force provided they manage the risk
to service personnel and keep the intervention short
and focused. UNITAF fit this pattern in Somalia, even
if the American commitment to UNOSOM II did not.
Humanitarian considerations figured prominently in
the Libyan mission, but the Obama administration
58

confined the intervention to a low-risk, air campaign.
In most cases intervention has to be justified based
upon pragmatic as well as altruistic grounds. In every
case but Somalia, a compelling U.S. interest underlay
the decision to get involved even when desire to alleviate suffering became a consideration. In the cases of
Bosnia and Kosovo, the need to promote regional stability and buttress the credibility of NATO combined
with a commitment to preventing genocide. Absent
such strategic considerations, stopping genocide did
not provide sufficient grounds for intervening in
Rwanda. The Obama administration certainly wished
to prevent Muammar Qaddafi slaughtering his own
people, but it also acted as much out of a commitment
to its NATO allies as from a desire to prevent the
deaths of innocent Libyans.
Even when humanitarian sentiment and strategic
interests combine, they do not always provide sufficient grounds for intervention, as the case of Syria
makes painfully clear. Washington has watched with
growing concern as the country slides deeper into civil war and President Bashir Assad uses increasingly
indiscriminate force against his own people. The White
House has also worried about the destabilizing effect
of Syria imploding in one of the most volatile areas
of the world. The President seems to support enforcement of a no-fly zone over the country and might even
allow direct air action against Syrian regime forces.
Strategic and humanitarian considerations have thus
favored intervention. International and domestic considerations, however, have not. Feeling misled in Libya by the NATO allies, Russia and China have made it
clear that they will not support intervention in Syria.
Russia in particular poses as Assad’s protector, which
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emboldens the dictator. Furthermore, as the situation
in that country deteriorated, the United States entered
a presidential election year. Facing a tough challenge
from Republican Mitt Romney, President Obama was
reluctant to risk an intervention that would be unpopular with both Congress and the American people.
Now that he has been re-elected, his reluctance has not
disappeared. War weariness from the long conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan and concern over the economy
has made the American public leery of another intervention that might be open-ended and costly in both
lives and money.
While domestic politics may be a major consideration when contemplating intervention during an election year, it is rarely a decisive factor at other times.
None of the interventions studied here was popular
with the possible (and ironic) exception of Somalia.
Even then, the initial desire to alleviate famine rapidly waned as the mission dragged on with no clear
end in sight. The American people have never had
much patience for foreign wars unless vital U.S. interests were clearly at stake. Lack of public or even congressional support has not stopped Presidents from
intervening in foreign crises. To intervene effectively,
however, they needed to prevent lack of support turning to outright opposition. Apathy is relatively easy to
overcome; hostility is not. As the case of Somalia clearly indicates, opposition increases with the duration of
the mission and the rise in casualties. While Congress
complains about the financial cost of missions, the
long deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo produced no
public outcry to bring the troops home. To the American public, blood means more than treasure. IFOR/
SFOR and KFOR lasted several years, but as they soon
became little more than confidence-building/stability
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missions that suffered virtually no casualties and represented no serious drain on military manpower, they
ruffled few feathers at home.
When to Intervene.
Deciding when to intervene can be as tricky as
choosing where to get involved. The old saying that
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure holds
true for foreign policy as for any other human endeavor, but the United States can seldom justify meddling
in the affairs of a sovereign state before a crisis requires
doing so. Somalia and Bosnia were failed states before
the United States intervened. Haiti had descended into
chaos, and Kosovo faced an impending genocide. The
United States did not initially support Kosovar independence. Only in the case of Libya, did Washington
reluctantly agree to back a revolutionary movement
that overthrew the existing government.
As a crisis unfolds, there may be an optimal time to
intervene. Unfortunately, optimal for the intervening
power may not be the same as optimal for the people
in the war-torn country. Bosnia provides an example
of this dilemma. Had the United States intervened
earlier, it would have saved many lives. By waiting
until Bosnian Serb power had reached its peak and
begun to decline, however, the Clinton administration
intervened under circumstances that assured success
in a short kinetic operation with little risk of casualties. The Croat and Bosniac ground offensives had created a tipping point that allowed a brief air campaign
to achieve decisive results.
In most cases, the United States had to allow diplomatic efforts to play out before it intervened militarily. A lengthy but ultimately futile peace process preceded the interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
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Bashir Assad has allowed fact-finding and observer
missions to forestall intervention as did Slobodan
Milošević. Muammar Qaddafi never got the chance to
dither, but the NATO allies offered him the opportunity to leave the country before being defeated and
summarily executed. The United States seldom controls precisely when it can intervene, and recognizing
the best time to do so is always clearer in hindsight.
However, the cases examined here suggests two optimal periods, depending on circumstances. In cases of
humanitarian crisis (famine, natural disasters, etc.),
early intervention offers better chances of success than
belated involvement. Early intervention is also desirable when the goal is to defend a threatened regime or
support a rebellion. In cases of civil war in which the
goal is to force both sides into a negotiated settlement,
it may be desirable to wait until the belligerents have
reached a stalemate. The odds that an American President will be able to determine precisely the best time
to intervene in the fluid situation of a crisis are, however, remote. Understanding the dynamics of conflicts
and crises may help policymakers time interventions
more effectively.
How to Intervene.
The manner in which the United States conducts
an intervention will affect its course and outcome.
Intervening as part of an alliance or coalition has
advantages and disadvantages. Alliances and coalitions usually limit the nature of intervention, producing least-common-denominator strategy. On the other
hand, they multiply resources and can convey greater
legitimacy on the intervention. The UN has the greatest ability to confer legitimacy on military operations,
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although getting its approval for intervention has
become more difficult. The missions to Haiti, Bosnia,
and Somalia operated under UN mandates. Technically the Libyan operation did as well, although Russia
and China have argued with some justification that the
NATO allies distorted the true intent of that mandate.
The Kosovo mission lacked UN approval but enjoyed
widespread international support, at least in the West.
In Haiti, the United States had the best of both worlds:
UN approval for a multilateral mission that was for all
intents and purposes unilateral.114
The refusal of the United States and its NATO
allies to intervene in Syria without UN approval suggests that international support is more than window
dressing. Unless it faces an immediate threat or sees
a significant strategic interest challenged, the United
States will probably not intervene anywhere unilaterally with the possible exception of its historic sphere
of influence in the Caribbean and Central America.
Even then, as the intervention in Haiti suggests,
Washington will try to seek international support
for intervention even in this region long considered
America’s backyard.
The cases examined suggest that the intervention in Haiti occurred under the most favorable circumstances. The United States enjoyed international
support for what it billed as a multilateral mission
without any of the constraints that normally go with
coalition operations. The mission became truly multilateral only after the permissive entry of U.S. forces
had accomplished the goal of removing the Haitian
dictator and restoring order to the island. As desirable as the circumstances of this intervention were,
they will probably not be duplicated in future crises
or conflicts.
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Whether acting unilaterally or as part of a coalition,
the United States must chose the precise means for
intervening in each case. From a purely military point
of view, it makes sense to use a maximum amount of
force. The mere threat of a U.S. invasion compelled
General Cédras to relinquish power in Haiti without
a shot being fired. By contrast, President Clinton’s
announcement that he would not invade Kosovo with
ground troops emboldened Milošević into believing
he could survive an air campaign, which he might
have done were it not for the fact that preserving
NATO credibility became a major mission objective.
Since interventions are classified as “operations other
than war” in U.S. military doctrine, however, they
will be mounted using limited U.S. assets. Somalia
involved air, land, and naval forces; Haiti was a permissive entry; Bosnia and Kosovo were air campaigns
followed by the permissive deployment of stability
missions; and Libya was an air campaign with no follow-on ground deployment. What assets the United
States can use will depend on the circumstances, but
committing too few military personnel, especially
when ground troops might be directly engaged in
hostilities, is always a bad idea. Leaving aside the wisdom of trying to capture Aidid in Somalia, the U.S.
contingent lacked the armor necessary to support
its Special Forces, and this weakness had disastrous
consequences.
The cases examined suggest that air power is,
politically at least, the most effective means of intervention, counterintuitive though that conclusion may
be. Despite improved guidance systems, manned
aircraft and cruise missiles are still relatively blunt
instruments, and even drones have trouble distinguishing friend from foe in urban areas. An enemy
who realizes he will only be attacked from the air can
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disperse his assets and disguise his soldiers. Air campaigns (short of wholesale bombing, which the United
States usually will not do) without ground troops take
much longer to produce results. In the case of Bosnia,
air action achieved decisive results rapidly because
Bosniac troops, and the NATO rapid reaction force
could exploit it. In Kosovo, an air campaign that was
supposed to last at most a few weeks took 78 days
to achieve results, during which time Kosovar civilians suffered terribly at the hands of Serbian forces. A
revived KLA and the threat of a NATO invasion contributed to success. The air campaign against Libya
also took months to achieve results, even with revolutionary forces on the ground.
Despite these drawbacks, however, airpower has
two definite political advantages: it puts few Americans at risk; and it seldom creates the legacy of bitterness produced by ground troops. The cases examined
suggest that occupation, not the level of force used to
intervene, produces the anti-American feelings that
can rapidly turn violent. Ordinary Somalis may have
appreciated the famine relief effort of 1992-93, but the
warring factions did not welcome into their country
either U.S. or UN troops, which they considered just
one more armed group in a multifaceted civil conflict.
The longer the troops remained, the more resentment
at their presence increased. Far less anti-American
feeling has arisen in Libya, where no ground troops
deployed. The attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi was probably the work of a terrorist group, not
a reflection of anti-American feeling throughout the
country. Americans are appreciated in Bosnia and
positively loved in Kosovo, but in those places, U.S.
troops entered permissively as part of a stabilization
force following an air campaign. Politically at least,

65

the ideal scenario for U.S. intervention (besides completely permissive entry as in Haiti) is American airpower deployed in support of ground forces provided
by coalition or alliance partners, which occurred in
both Bosnia and Libya.
Unfortunately, what is best for the United States
is not always best for the people on whose behalf
the intervention is mounted. Air campaigns to protect civilians or to support rebellion must be selective, but even when they are conducted with great
restraint, they still cause civilian casualties. They also
take time to achieve results, and during that time, the
regime continues to kill innocent people. Problematic though it is, however, under some circumstances
air action may be the only way the White House can
mount an intervention acceptable to Congress and the
American people.
Follow-on Missions.
Interventions rarely conclude with the end of hostilities. The instability and political strife that prompted the intervention usually necessitate a protracted
follow-on mission. U.S. doctrine conceptualizes intervention using a five-phase model, ranging from deterrence (Phase 1) through military operations (Phases 2
and 3) to stabilization and restoration of normal government (Phases 4 and 5).115 The United States in general and the U.S. military in particular have a strong
dislike for Phase 4 Stability Operations. Dubbed by
its critics and proponents alike as “nation building,”
Phase 4 involves a multiplicity of tasks. Although few
of these tasks are military in nature, performing them
often requires the kind of security only soldiers can
provide. The human terrain in which stability opera-
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tions take place precludes using most of the assets
of a high-tech, maneuver-warfare army. Troops may
come under fire from insurgents or malcontents they
cannot easily identify because they hide within a sullen or even hostile civilian population. Under such
circumstances, soldiers can quickly go from being
welcomed as liberators to being resented as occupiers,
which occurred in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Phase
4 operations also create a “you-broke-it, you-bought
it” situation that makes it hard for American forces to
withdraw in a timely manner.
The United States, thus, understandably avoids
direct involvement in Phase 4 stability operations
and tries to limit its role when such avoidance proves
impossible. Somalia provides a lesson of what can
happen when Washington commits American troops
to an open-ended stability operation. The Clinton
administration did not repeat the mistake it made
in East Africa. When American forces in Haiti found
themselves having to assume a law and order role for
which they were not prepared, they quickly adjusted
their rules of engagement and promptly handed over
the UN mission responsibility for Phase 4, contributing only a small number of personnel to that operation.
The United States did commit a large troop contingent
to both IFOR and KFOR but only after an air campaign
compelled permissive entry of those missions into
Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. Once it deployed
American troops, however, the White House kept the
U.S. contingents on a very short leash. Robust rules of
engagement, rigorous force protection measures, and
a narrow definition of the mission prevented casualties. In the case of Libya, of course, the United States
deployed no troops at all.
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Exit Strategy.
Disengaging from interventions can be extraordinarily difficult. Fragile states easily degenerate into
failed ones, and the nation, alliance, or coalition that
successfully intervenes often finds itself saddled with
an expensive nation-building mission that can last
years. Given the American dislike for both nationbuilding and open-ended commitments, a viable exit
strategy (preferably right after kinetic operations
cease) should be part of any intervention plan. In all
but one of the interventions examined here, the United States had either an exit strategy or a plan for keeping American ground troops out of harm’s way, while
reducing their numbers as soon as possible.
As previously noted, the intervention in Somalia
might for the sake of academic argument be viewed
as two operations. UNITAF did have a clear exit strategy. The Marines planned to remain long enough to
secure delivery of humanitarian aid and then withdraw. They accomplished their goal in a short, decisive operation from December 1992 to May 1994. Had
the United States withdrawn all of its force at the end
of that period, the mission would have been heralded
as a success. Instead, the Clinton administration chose
to keep some American forces in country as part of a
rather open-ended UN peace operation. The new mission had the broad goal of restoring normal political
life but no clear plan for achieving it. Somalis soon
perceived UNOSOM II as yet another armed faction,
and the October 3 “Blackhawk Down” incident soon
followed. The United States did pull its troops out
soon after the debacle, but it did so in a manner that
looked more like an ignominious withdrawal than a
decisive exit strategy.
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BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS
The questions posed by this analysis all factor
into considering whether or not to mount an armed
intervention. They are not always, however, of equal
importance, and they may interact in different ways
under different circumstances. Maintaining political will by sustaining public support for operations
would appear to be the most critical issue in mounting an intervention, but the cases examined herein do
not support such a simple conclusion. To begin with,
political will does not always require popular support. None of the interventions examined here was
particularly popular. The Pew Research Center determined that in March 2011, only 27 percent of Americans felt the United States had an obligation to “do
something about” the fighting in Libya.116 In March
1999, 47 percent felt Washington should get involved
in Kosovo, but only 30 percent felt that way about Bosnia in June 1995.117 With less than a third of the American public behind him, President Clinton intervened
successfully in Kosovo and President Obama in Libya.
Although more than half of Americans (51 percent)
favored taking action to stop the killing in Darfur in
December 2006, President Bush did not even consider
such action.118
Presidents may not need to have popular support
for intervention, but they need to avoid opposition.
Opposition arises most quickly when American servicemen and women die. The Somalia mission provides the best illustration. Support for the intervention went from a high of 84 percent in January 1993
to a low of 33 percent after the October 3 “Blackhawk
Down” incident.119 The decline in support, however,

69

may not have reflected a simple correlation with rising casualties, but revealed instead unhappiness over
deaths in a mission whose goals Americans no longer supported.120 In other words, the public accepted
casualties incurred while saving Somalia children
from starvation, but did not approve loss of life suffered trying to capture Aidid. Matthew Baum has
postulated a further explanation for the role of public opinion in military interventions. He suggests
that public opinion will have the greatest impact on
presidential behavior during an intervention in which
media attention is intense, the stakes for the United
States are low, and the President lacks confidence in
the outcome of the mission—conditions that existed
in the case of Somalia after the October 3 incident.121
These findings and the cases examined suggest that
public opinion matters, but that its precise impact on
decisionmaking is complex and difficult to track. It
seems to matter most when a mission goes badly.
The likelihood of casualties and therefore of
adverse public opinion depends in part upon the
means used to intervene. As the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya illustrate, air action costs few, if any,
American lives and, perhaps ironically, produces less
of a backlash in the country being bombed than does
occupation by ground forces. This advantage suggests
that Presidents will opt for air action whenever possible. However, Phase 4 stability operations cannot
be conducted with cruise missiles, attack aircraft, or
predator drones. The cases examined suggest that U.S.
participation in Phase 4, follow-on stability operations
creates no serious problems for policymakers, strategists, or the American public provided they do not
result in casualties.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LAND POWER
An analysis of this type would be incomplete without consideration of its implications for the future of
U.S. landpower, particularly the size and composition
of the army. With the Iraq war over and the conflict
in Afghanistan winding down, a reduction in military
spending and/or reallocation of defense resources
seems likely. The nature of the U.S. military in the next
decade will depend on the strategic tasks given it by
the political leadership. The threat posed by China has
already led to a shift in resources to the Pacific, a trend
that seems likely to continue. Those resources will be
primarily naval and air assets, but the required additional allocations for the Navy and Air Force could
pull resources from the Army. Land forces will, of
course, remain a vital component of the U.S. military,
but their strategic role will be diverse and challenging,
covering contingencies ranging from counterterrorism
through insurgency to mid-level conventional war.
In some cases these contingencies will be present in
challenging combinations generically dubbed “hybrid
wars.”122 The likelihood of each contingency for the
foreseeable future will impact the size and composition of land forces.
The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) insists that in addition to preparing for
conventional war:
U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities
to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in
concert with partners.123

71

A Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report published
the previous year drew a similar conclusion: “Armed
stabilization may be the next most common and most
important major combat operation (MCO) for DoD
[Department of Defense] land forces.”124 As the cases
analyzed here suggest, some form of Phase 4 stability operations often follow armed intervention into
the affairs of a foreign state. Such operations require
substantial deployments of ground forces performing
a multitude of tasks for a sustained period of time. To
carry out such missions, American forces will:
require capabilities to create a secure environment
in fragile states in support of local authorities and,
if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing
essential government services, restoring emergency
infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian relief.125

The QDR makes two specific recommendations
designed to enhance the ability of the U.S. military
to conduct unconventional operations: “Increase
COIN [counterinsurgency], stability operations, and
CT [counterterrorism] competency and capacity in
general purpose forces;” and “Expand civil affairs
capacity.”126 The SSI study recommends that land
forces “optimize for the limited armed stabilization of
crippled states.”127
These and many other studies address the types
of operations U.S. land forces will perform without
addressing the size of the army. They also leave unaddressed the balance of conventional versus unconventional capability. Traditional wisdom has it that preparing Soldiers to conduct the one type of operation
degrades their ability to conduct the other. At least
one study challenges this wisdom, arguing that it is
based on the fallacious assumption that U.S. forces are
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slower to transition than their foes and so must choose
either a conventional or an unconventional focus.128
The experience of Afghanistan and Iraq supports the
conclusion of this study, since both wars demonstrated the ability of American troops to adapt to changing
circumstances. These reports and the findings of this
Paper point to the same important lesson: whatever
the size of the U.S. Army, it must train two-speed Soldiers equally capable of both conventional and unconventional operations. There will, of course, always
be the need for specialized units. President Obama’s
commitment to expanding Special Forces will enhance
the U.S. military’s ability to conduct a broad range of
missions as will expansion of civil affairs units, which
occurred during the Iraq and Afghan Wars and will
probably continue.
CONCLUSION
Making recommendations to guide future policy
is much harder than identifying patterns and deriving
lessons from past campaigns. Much depends on the
historical circumstances in which events unfold. In the
aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. military and the American public had little stomach for protracted intervention. The 1980s saw short, decisive actions in Grenada
and Panama, the small covert operation in Nicaragua,
and the advisory mission in El Salvador. During the
decade following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the
United States mounted several large-scale interventions. With the war in Iraq over and the 2014 date for
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan
fast approaching, the country appears to be entering
another period of disillusionment with nation-building. War-weariness combined with the tremendous
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cost of the two lengthy conflicts and the weak state
of the American economy will make it harder for the
President to intervene in the internal affairs of other
states unless major strategic interests are clearly and
demonstratively at stake.
In the event the United States finds it necessary to
intervene for either strategic or humanitarian reasons
(or a combination of the two), however, this Paper suggests a reasonable approach to such missions. Whenever possible, the United States should intervene on
behalf of a coalition, preferably with UN approval. It
should confine its contribution to providing air power,
high tech support, logistics, and perhaps covert operatives. This approach worked well in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Libya. The United States suffered no combat casualties in any of these conflicts, and in none of these
countries have people exhibited the widespread antiAmericanism that followed the occupations of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It must be clearly understood, however, that no air campaign can be purely
defensive. No-fly zones can only be imposed through
gaining air supremacy, which requires destroying the
enemy’s air defense system. Also, without an opposition movement on the ground or allies willing to
deploy ground troops, air action alone will probably
not achieve decisive results.
However much it may wish to avoid such a mission, there will be times when the United States finds
it necessary or desirable to intervene in a civil conflict
or humanitarian crisis with ground forces. In the case
of an insurgency threatening a friendly government,
intervention may best be done with Special Operations
Forces. When a humanitarian crisis occurs in a weak
or failed state, intervention may require deployment
of a more substantial mission. In such a situation, the
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case of UNITAF in Somalia provides the best example of how to proceed. The intervening force should
be large, heavily armed, and have clear, robust rules
of engagement. The mission should have a definite,
achievable goal, a reasonable time limit, and a sound
exit strategy. While it may not always be possible to
have such precise control of the variables in an operation, Washington should be able to anticipate and plan
for such eventualities. Controlled evolution of a mission is different than uncontrolled mission creep. The
Black Hawk Down incident would not have happened
had the Clinton administration stuck to the original goal of alleviating famine and not gotten drawn
into arresting a warlord. The mission would then
have ended in the spring of 1993 and been deemed
a success.
In cases where the intervention takes the form of
a post-conflict stability operation, a much larger force
can safely be deployed as occurred in both Bosnia
and Kosovo. Even then, however, the U.S. contingent
should be kept as small as possible, steadily reduced
in size, and withdrawn as soon as it reasonably can
be. The more American Soldiers on the ground, the
greater the likelihood of something going wrong. The
longer U.S. troops stay in a country, the sooner their
presence will be resented.
Intervention for reasons other than clear, immediate self-interest will probably remain unpopular with
the American public for the foreseeable future. This
unpopularity will not, however, make such missions
go away. Presidents have to consider the national
interest in terms far more subtle and nuanced than
those of the average voter. That interest will surely
require the United States to intervene in a civil conflict
or humanitarian emergency somewhere in the world
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during the next decade. The success of that intervention will depend on how well it is planned and executed in light of the questions raised herein.
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